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ABSTRACT
TURKEY’S REJECTION BY THE EUROPEAN UNION DUE TO 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND DEMOCRACY
GÜNİZ GÜRER
M.A., Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor; Associate Professor Meltem Müftüler Baç 
January 2000
This thesis addresses the reasons for Turkey’s rejection by the European 
Union focusing on the issues of human rights violations and democratic instability. 
The proposition that these political issues are the basis for EU's refusal to admit 
Turkey to the Union, is developed by means of an analysis of Europe’s historic 
movement towards ever greater political integration, Turkey’s relations with Europe 
during its separate historical development, and the sometimes conflicting 
European/Turkish views on the concept of human rights and the role of the military 
in Turkish politics. Finally, survey material is utilized to illustrate that the European 
Union is widely viewed in Turkey as primarily an economic rather than political 
entity, a finding which may help explain the apparent discrepancy in opinion 
between Turkey and Europe regarding European rejection of the Turkish bid to join 
the Union.
Keywords; Human Rights, Democracy
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ÖZET
TÜRKİYE’NİN İNSAN HAKLARI İHLALLERİ VE DEMOKRASİ 
NEDENİ İLE AVRUPA TOPLULUĞU TARAFINDAN
REDDEDİLMESİ
GÜNİZ GÜRER
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Meltem Müftüler Baç
Ocak 2000
Bu tez Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği tarafından reddedilmesinin nedenlerini 
insan haklan ihlalleri ve demokratik dengesizliğe odaklanarak araştırmaktadır. Bu 
politik konuların Avrupa Birliği'nin Türkiye'yi birliğe kabul etmemesine temel 
oluşturmasına dair önerge; A.vrupa'nın daha büyük bir birleşmeye doğru gitmesi, 
Türkiye'nin kendi tarihi içinde Avrupa ile Türkiye arasında insan hakları ve askerin 
Türk politikasındaki rolü gibi zaman zaman çakışan konuları analiz etmektir. Son 
olarak, bu araştırma AB'nin Türkiye'de politik olmaktan çok ekonomik bir birlik 
olduğunu göstermektedir ki, bu bulgu belki de Türkiye'nin birliğe kabul edilmemesi 
ile ilgili olarak Türkiye ile Avmpa arasındaki büyük fikir farklılığını da 
açıklamaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsan Hakları, Demokrasi
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis focuses on the Turkish position vis-ci-vis the European Union. The 
main proposition is that the EU has rejected Turkey’s pleas for membership due to 
problems associated with human rights and democracy. The EU has rejected Turkey 
for a number of specific reasons such as: the dispute with Greece, the Cyprus issue, 
the Kurdish problem, various human rights violations, and democratic stability. 
Although there are many reasons for Turkey’s rejection, I would like to focus on the 
human rights and democracy issues as the most salient barriers to membership in the 
organization. Turkey’s attempts at European membership will be analyzed especially 
from this perspective of the European Union.
The purpose of this thesis is to isolate the main reasons of the rejection for 
full membership. The thesis proposes that human rights and democracy are the most 
important barriers which negatively affect Turkey’s accession to the European Union. 
Though there are many factors which shaped European policy on Turkey, other 
reasons for rejection are beyond the scope of this thesis. My proposition is that while 
these are the main problems blocking Turkish accession to the EU, there have been 
improvements in the policies in Turkey on the issue of human rights. In addition to 
this, Turkey should attempt to improve its efforts to show that its human rights record 
is better than it is perceived.
In order to be accepted by the EU, Turkey must rectify its deficits; this thesis 
will try to portray relations between the two parties from the beginning till today. The
I
European Conumunity was established for economic cooperation among states under 
the name of European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. The history of the EU will 
be discussed in the thesis, emphasizing the integration of the nation-states into the 
EC. I will investigate the relationship between leading integration theories and the 
formation of the EU. So the emergence of the nation-state and the concept of 
sovereignty will be the starting point of this thesis since the EU is made up of
sovereign states.
The main aim of this thesis is to show the ties between the EU and Turkey 
and the criteria for membership in the EU put forward in the Copenhagen Criteria. In 
the Copenhagen European Council of 1993, it was declared that the candidate 
countries must have rule of law, a democratic type of rule, a functioning free market 
economy, and respect human rights. Turkey has been waiting to be accepted as a full 
member since the Association Agreement of Ankara Treaty (1963). In the 
development of the European Union, the Customs Union Agreement was signed 
between Turkey and EU in 1995 as an end point after thirty-six years from the 
Accession Treaty. Thus, in this thesis I investigate why Turkey is still waiting for 
admittance, while the EU has refonnulated itself from the EC to the EU. This thesis 
thus points to the reasons for the EU’s “wait and see” policy towards Turkey.
In the first chapter, I will look at to the historical evolution of integration 
theories and their challenge to the nation state. This provides the hypothesis that 
nation states should not like to cede their sovereignty to a supranational organization 
and why challenging the traditional Westphalian state understanding is not simple. 
By looking at to the relation of formation of the nation states and integration theories, 
I hope to provide some insight into the EU and why Turkey’s place in the EU may be 
problematic.
In the second chapter I will focus on Turkey’s place in Europe by analyzing 
the impact of the Ottoman Empire on Turkey’s relations with Europe. Then I will 
proceed on to Turkey’s history with the EU, and focus on the impacts of the 
challenges of the post Cold War era on Turkey’s route to the West. Since 1923 
Turkey’s global position has been ambiguous. Turkey is a member of NATO and has 
been an associate member of the WEU since 1992, but on the other hand it is not a 
member of the EU. The WEU became both parts of NATO and the EU after the 
Maastricht summit decisions. Turkey has a role to play in bringing peace and stability 
in its region, especially to the newly established ex-communist states. Turkey has 
shown itself to be a valuable ally for Europe and believes it should be incorporated 
into the new European order.
In chapter three, I will focus on the issues of human rights and democracy as 
the visible obstacles blocking Turkey’s acceptance into the EU as a full member. 
Turkey’s poor record on human rights is not the only reason for the EU’s rejection, 
but nevertheless it is a valid concern for the EU and an important problem that has to 
be addressed by Turkey. This chapter stresses the unavoidable perception of Turkey 
in the eyes of the world as a state that does not respect democracy and human rights.
In 1998 the 50'*' anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
was celebrated. The President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, stated 
that the Declaration reflects the European Union’s position on human rights and 
democratization. Even though the EC was an economic entity, the EU has become a 
political union. As such, human rights were mentioned in the Single European Act of 
1987. The Treaty on European Union in Maastricht also refers to this issue. In Article 
F it was stated that.
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on November 1950 and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the member 
states, as general principles of Community law (Duparc, 1993: 58).
The EU has begun negotiations with the ex-communist states concerning EU
membership and has encouraged their efforts to establish democracy, rule of law, and
free market economies. On the other hand, Turkey has been struggling to establish
democratic government, a free market economy, and rule of law for years, but
Turkey has been neglected in the agenda of enlargement of the EU.
The fourth chapter provides statistical data from a survey of Turkish
journalists, academicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen. The questions concern the
relations between the EU and Turkey. They show that the attitudes of Turkish elites
correspond with the EU perspective to some extent. The data show that respondents
believe that the human rights policy of Turkey must be changed, and the Kurdish
issue must be solved, but not for the sake of the EU. They feel that Turkey must
solve its problems for its own sake. Also it is interesting to realize that the EU is seen
primarily as an economic institution, membership in which will bring both economic
benefits and economic harm at the same time. The EU is firstly regarded as an
economic organization rather than a political union.
In short, Turkey is regarded as a state which does not respect human rights
and democracy. Although improvements have been made in Turkey, these are not
enough to secure the admission of Turkey to the Union. As democratic government
has been interrupted by military intervention three times in Turkey, it is hard for the
EU to believe that this will not happen again. So, the EU has condemned Turkey for
not having a fully functioning democracy, although it has practiced multi-party
democracy for most of the post-war period. Even so, the EU has stated that Turkey 
has not been consistently respectful of the fundamental rights of its citizens, while 
Turkey has replied that that there are human rights violations in every country and 
that Turkey is committed to implementing fundamental rights, despite its spotty 
record.
CHAPTER I
THE EUROPEAN UNION; A Challenge to the Concept of
Sovereignty
This chapter focuses on the evolution of the idea of European integration, and 
its challenges to state sovereignty. First, I will look at European history to depict the 
roots of the state system, then go on to an analysis of European integration and 
theories behind it. Especially in this chapter I point to the notions of “sovereignty” 
and “state formation” which emerged after the Peace of Westphalia. The modem 
state was not challenged until the formation of international organizations such as the 
European Union (EU). Such organizations facilitate the integration process of states, 
and integration has been the most important factor in redefining and reshaping the 
European state.
The concept of sovereignty is central to this chapter, since in the integration 
theories examined below, the cooperation of states is closely linked with the question 
of the transfer of sovereignty to supranational organizations. European state 
formation has played a decisive role in the formation of the state system of the world, 
and modem state formation and the concept of sovereignty are tied together when we 
look back at the history of the formation of the state.
Sovereignty is related to the notion of the modem state. Bodin expressed 
sovereignty as “the right to impose laws generally on all subjects regardless of their 
consent”(Held, 1995: 39). The modem state is expressed as “an impersonal and
privileged legal or constitutional order, delimiting a common structure of authority 
which specifies the nature and form of control and administration over a territory” 
(Held, 1995: 38). We see the application of these concepts after the Peace of 
Westphalia. As the two-headed system of governance diminished, the Church's 
power over the prince was eliminated so that for the first time administrative and 
religious tasks were separated. The concept of the sovereign state has emerged and 
developed since then.
The idea of a united Europe that developed after WWI challenged the notion 
of sovereignty central to the Westphalian order. After the experience of WWI, there 
emerged attempts at a peaceful, voluntary association of states. In 1923, Count 
Coudenhove Kalergi, the Austrian founder-leader of the Pan-European Movement, 
called for a United States of Europe. And on 5 September 1929, French Foreign 
Minister Aristide Briand made a speech in the League of Nations Assembly in 
Geneva proclaiming that there was a need of a European Union within the context of 
the League of Nations and this was also supported by the German Foreign Minister 
(Borchardt, 1995: 5). However, the League could not do more than promote closer 
cooperation between the sovereign states of Europe, and the great depression led to 
protectionism and fostered the rise of fascism in Italy, Germany, and the Far East. 
Thus, optimism about European Unity was delayed until after WWII.
After WWII, various attempts towards European peace emerged; with these 
attempts, European unification emerged as a viable opinion, with the ultimate aim the 
restoration of peace in Europe. Prior to analysing the European integration process 
and its impact on definitions of sovereignty, one should look at post WWn 
developments. The following section analyses the attempts after the Second World 
War to secure peace in Europe.
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1.1. Post World War Developments and Political Integration in Europe
Europe will not be built all at once, or as a single whole; it will be built by 
concrete achievements, which first create de facto solidarity.
Schuman Declaration (Hackett, 1990: 35).
Before the knitting of states into the European Union, various other 
approaches had been attempted until the European states were unified under one 
umbrella. The desire to create a better, freer, and more just world in which state 
relations would be conducted more peacefully led to the emergence of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Western 
European Union (WEU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Some 
of these organizations were fomied to strengthen the ties between the United States 
of America and Western Europe.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OEEC then 
renamed OECD in 1961) was established in order to implement US Secretary of 
State George Marshall’s plan to rebuild Europe. Sixteen countries joined in the 
Marshall Plan: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Eire, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, 
and GeiTnany (zones occupied by the British, French, and Americans). The initial 
task of the organization was to act as a mediator between the sixteen nations to 
maintain financial stability, with the ultimate goal to minimize the trade deficit of 
Europe with the USA. In 1961, its membership was broadened to include the USA, 
Canada, Finland, Spain, West Germany, and Japan. Its purpose was reformulated “to 
achieve the highest sustainable economic growth... and employment by maintaining 
financial stability for the development of the World economy” (Goodman, 1990; 19).
The second organization created with US support was the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO was a military pact designed to balance 
security in the world by binding the member States (the USA, Canada, and most of 
the Western European states, including Turkey) militarily. Although NATO was 
formed primarily to contain the Soviet Union, part of NATO’s importance lies in its 
capacity to prevent future European war, since member states are militarily 
interdependent.
A third attempt to provide European security was organized among the 
Europeans themselves. At the end of 1947, it became inevitable that Germany would 
be divided. In 1948, British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin put forth the idea of a 
“Western Union” (Goodman, 1990; 20). After the Russian coup d ’état in 
Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg signed the Treaty of Brussels in March 1948 for military and economic 
cooperation. Later the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and 
Greece were included. In order to maintain European security, a plan for common 
defence was launched. The idea of creating a European Defence Community (EDC) 
with a supranational European army was bom. The plan was organized by the French 
Prime Minister, Rene Pleven, but was later put forward by the French Foreign 
Minister Robert Schumann to the Council of Europe in 1951. The USA supported the 
European Defence Community, but France and the United Kingdom were opposed to 
this idea.
In regard to political integration in Europe, on 5 May 1949 the Council of 
Europe was founded by ten members: the United Kingdom, France, the Benelux 
countries, Italy, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. It aimed to foster political 
cooperation. Over the years new members have been admitted: Austria, West
Germany, Cyprus, Switzerland. Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Iceland, Malta,
Liechtenstein, Finland, San Marino, Flungary, and Poland. In the Council of Europe,
decisions are made by the Committee of Ministers and unanimity is required for all
decisions. Thus any country can use its veto power as in the United Nations Security
Council. There is a Parliamentary Assembly, which is a consultative body that can
put recommendations to the committee of ministers. The Council of Europe is an
intergovernmental cooperative body, and includes various conventions. The most
important is the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, adopted in November 1950. With this convention, the
European Commission for Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights
were established to condemn human right abuses.
Thus in the immediate aftermath of WWn, a number of attempts were made
to create a new European system. European integration with the EC started with the
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, which formed
the nucleus of the "European Community”. The original six - Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, signed the Treaty in April 1951,
and it came into force in 1952. It conformed to the plan put forward by Robert
Schumann, the French Foreign Minister, and Jean Monnet, who was the head of the
French Economic Planning Commission. The Schumann-Monnet plan rested on
Franco-German cooperation for production of coal and steel under a joint authority in
which other countries could participate. In Monnet’s words:
For five years the whole French nation had been making efforts to 
recreate the bases of production, but it became evident that to go 
beyond recovery towards steady expansion and higher standards of 
life for all, the resources of a single nation were not sufficient. It was 
necessary to transcend the national framework (George, 1996: 2).
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It was the first time that authority for a central policy had been handed over to 
a supranational organization. Its importance thus was derived from its challenge to 
the modem state. It was hoped that economic integration would lead the way towards 
a political union. The European Economic Community (EEC) and the European 
Atomic Community (Euratom) were established with the Rome Treaty signed on 25 
March 1957. Within the framework of the EEC, member states wanted to create a 
common market where persons, services, goods, and capital would move freely. 
Euratom, the second community created by the Rome Treaty, was designed to 
encourage the development of nuclear technology. Thus, in the 1950s, European 
integration rose from attempts to restore order within this framework.
One should look at the theoretical foundations underlying European 
integration and how these challenge the concept of state sovereignty, since the 
founding of the European Community/Union is one of the major events in European 
history since the Peace of Westphalia.
The next section will look at the theoretical foundations of European integration.
1.2. Federalism
In international relations there is the assumption that wars occur because there 
is nothing to prevent them; this is the essence of the state of anarchy (Waltz: 1979). 
Thus there is need of a central authority to prevent violence. The solution is to 
establish a centralized political authority constructed by a federation of states. 
R.W.G. Mackay has put forward a definition of federalism as referring to European 
integration:
Federalism is a method of dividing powers of a government so that
the central and regional governments are within a limited sphere co­
ll
ordinate but independent. The test of the principles is does it embody 
the division of powers between central and regional authorities, each 
being independent of the other? The principle is seen applied at its 
best in the United States of America, Australia, Canada and India 
(Mutimer, 1994; 17).
For him this is the transfer of power of national-states to regional authorities. 
In the European context this idea was redefined by Ernest Wistrich in his proposal for 
European Federation; “The essence of federalism lies in the decentralization of 
power wherever needs can be satisfied at lower levels of government, closer to the 
citizen” (Mutimer, 1994; 18). Wistrich’s definition did not envision a two tiered 
organization of political power as central domination of regional governments. This 
redefinition of federalism was a step forward to the European Union. The principle of 
“subsidiarity” (decisions taken at an appropriate level to the task in hand), 
(Goodman, 1997; 178), was the core of the program of the Maastricht Treaty. Flence 
such a definition of federalism holds out the possibility for a new form of state; a 
federation based on subsidiarity would allow power to be separated at different levels 
(Mutimer, 1994; 19).
A federal solution to European conflict has been attempted during the post­
war peace period in continental Europe since it was felt that the concepts of 
sovereignty and the nation-state had to be reformed after the horrors of the Second 
World War. The main tenet of federalism is the creation of supranational institutions 
which allow sovereign countries to breathe freely in their safely drawn borders while 
at the same time they are united for common goals. Generally, the common goals will 
pave the way towards further political union.
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Means used For achieving political integration differed in the federalist 
approach. One approach used for integration is based on conventions/treaties. For 
this to be realized there is need of a Constituent Assembly, which can draft a 
constitution which can be adopted and put into force by the member states. But the 
Council of Europe could not handle this role nor could it create such an assembly. 
According to the French Federalist Guy Heraud, integration cannot be achieved 
where there are separate constitutions carried out by governments where power is 
lacking in central institutions (Aybet, 1997: 13). Federalists were successful in 
establishing the European Parliament (EP) as an elected body in 1979, and the “Draft 
Treaty Establishing European Union” was prepared by the EP.
Another type of federalist process is direct intergovernmental agreement 
(Mutimer, 1994: 20). The Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty are the 
most important developments regarding integration and the European Union.
In short, federalism was regarded after the Second World War as a possibility 
to unite the European states in order to avoid another violent confrontation between 
these states. It could not provide a total solution to the question of integration as 
indicated by the failure of the European Defence Community.
Another approach to political integration is functionalism.
1,3. Functionalism / Neofunctionalism
Functionalism appeared at the end of World War II when David Mitrany 
published A Working Peace System in 1943, where he argued for ways to prevent 
wars. Mitrany saw the division of the world into “competing political units” as the 
reason for international conflict. In his approach, the interests of different nations
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could be integrated if integration were flexible, technocratic, and pragmatic (Mitrany, 
1966: 77).
Functionalists stressed the need for cooperation among nation states. It is believed 
that due to the gradual convergence of states’ interests, they will cooperate on a 
peaceful level. Functionalism points to the need to encourage common ties between 
states through low politics such as trade, as a path towards cooperation. Common 
concerns about how to solve economic problems were at a peak in the period after 
the war which made Europeans think primarily in economic terms.
The key dynamic of functionalism is the proposition that all technical and
functional problems can be solved at the international level. For functionalists,
sovereignty need not be transfeixed to transnational organizations when solving a
transnational problem. If there was a clear need of international services to address
international problems, then international political authorities would be established.
Mitrany described functional integration like this:
What would be the broad lines of such a functional organization of 
international activities? The essential principle is that activities would 
be selected specifically and organized separately, each according to its 
nature, to the conditions under which it has to operate, and to the 
needs of the moment. It would allow therefore all freedom for 
practical variation in the organization of the several functions, as well 
as in the working of a particular function as needs and conditions alter 
(Mutimer, 1994: 24).
Organizations would be established due to particular needs but how these 
needs would be selected was not expressed in his work. National governments kept 
their unitary character but they would be tied to each other through functional 
activities. States would somehow agree on the activities where they would be
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dependent on each other, but sovereignty, as the most important priority of a state, 
would not be transfeired to an international organization, Mitrany believed that 
technical cooperation could be depoliticized, thus the question of sovereignty would 
be eliminated. Mitrany’s claim that regarding things at a technical level one can 
eliminate their political character is open to debate. Reginold Harrison put forward 
such a critique when he stated that “functionalism ultimately involves the allocation 
of resources and such allocative decisions are necessarily political” (Mutimer, 1994; 
26). Keohane pointed to the essential political and conflictual nature of inter-state 
relations when he remarked in After Hegemony that if “harmony existed with no 
conflict of interests, there would be no need for cooperation” (Aybet, 1997: 19).
In the world of today where everything is politicised and also globalised I 
think it is impossible to regard such issues as either exclusively technical or 
exclusively political. If there is not a central authority then how would individuals or 
states be bound to that structure? If there is not an international body with the power 
to impose binding decisions on a contractual basis then how and why would states 
cooperate? In response to such criticism Mitrany’s theory was reformulated and 
revised by the neofunctionalists.
Neofunctionalist theory regards integration as a process that must result in 
institutional development. Jane Sweeny has written in relation to the institutional 
level development of the European Parliament, that “institutions are an important 
outcome of the integration process, that is, they are a measure of the success of the 
integration project” (Mutimer, 1994: 31). Karl W. Deutsch pointed out that 
integration depends upon the integration of social groups through learning by 
individuals. Learning refers to the level of communication and this will strengthen 
the community. So for Deutsch, integration is a process, not a condition, and it
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develops due to interaction among people both at the elite and mass levels. 
According to Karl Deutsch,
A security-community is a group of people which has become 
“integrated”. By sense of community we mean a belief on the part of 
individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least 
this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved 
by process of “peaceful change.”By peaceful change we mean the 
resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized producers, 
without resort to large-scale physical force (Deutsch, 1957: 335).
If a long-term peace could be sustained by the interaction among people 
within an institution then political integration would be the end result. Deutsch’s 
thesis proposes that if people do not have this sense of community it is impossible to 
cooperate on a political level, which is similar to the neofunctionalist understanding 
of political “spill-over”. Another aspect of neofunctionalism is the idea of 
“supranationality”. This is not a total transfer of national sovereignty to a 
supranational level, but it is believed that if central institutions were seen as 
necessary, states would delegate some of their sovereignty to a central authority 
encouraged by the spill-over effect. But the establishment of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) could not pave for the establishment of the EDC. The plan 
for the creation of a common defence policy under a unified army -the EDC- turned 
out to be a disappointment due to the veto by France which felt that the national 
interests of a sovereign state required that national sovereignty not be pooled in a 
higher authority. As a result, economic integration did not lead to integration on 
defence, which indicates that spill-over is not always successful. So, 
neofunctionalism is not be the perfect theory of political integration as it is faced with 
the same problem as other theories faced-transfer of sovereignty.
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1.4. European Community to European Union
World War II had just left Europe deeply pessimist and feeling that their 
relations had to be reformulated so as to live together peacefully. In 1948, the Hague 
Congress established the Council of Europe, which was the first indication of the 
European movement. In 1951, thanks to the efforts of French Foreign Minister 
Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, the Treaty on the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) was designed to unite the coal and steel production of France 
and West Germany under its authority. It was hoped that the traditional problem 
between France and Germany would be eliminated, and Germany would be bound 
politically and economically to a higher organization, thus the potential aggressor 
would be under control. With the signing of the Treaty, it was the first time that one 
significant area of a nation state’s authority passed to the control of a supranational 
organization voluntarily.
In 1952, the ECSC member states signed the Treaty for European Defence 
Community (EDC) which was known as the René Pleven Plan. At that time the 
Korean War had just broken out, East-West relations were not going smoothly and 
thus there was need for a common European army which would include West 
Germany. However, the Second World War had not been forgotten by the French so 
for them a German national army was unacceptable. There were efforts by the six 
Foreign Ministers to agree on the issue in August 1954. But the European Defence 
Community was rejected by the French National Assembly. It was rejected on the 
argument that nations could not cede sovereignty to a higher authority. As a result, 
the idea of a defence community was abandoned in the 1950s. After the failure of the 
EDC, the Foreign Ministers of the Original Six met in Messina in 1955 for the 
“creation of a united Europe” (Borchardt, 1995: 10). Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-
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Henri Spaak prepared a report on Further integration. In 1957 the Treaty of Rome 
established the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom), which aimed at the creation of a common market for 
the free movement of persons, goods, services, capital, (the four freedoms), and the 
development of nuclear technology.
In order to forge political integration, leaders of the Six met at a summit in 
Bonn in 1961 under a committee chaired by Christian Fouchet, the French 
ambassador to Denmark. Fouchet tried to secure political cooperation among the 
member states but this failed. In 1963 a Franco-German friendship treaty was signed 
dealing with integration. During the 1960s there was a clash between national and 
supranational interests which blocked the way towards integration. This clash came 
to a peak in 1965. France had not been taking part in EEC meetings, in keeping with 
its ‘empty chair policy’ (Weidenfeld and Wessels, 1997: 10). As a response to this 
behaviour, the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 stated that the Council of Ministers 
could take decisions on important issues by a qualified-majority vote. However, the 
compromise also introduced the right of veto for member states, blocking further 
transfer of sovereignty.
On 1-2 December of 1969, the Flague Summit was held designed to encourage 
further integration. It was both concerned with the enlargement through the inclusion 
of northern countries and with a call issuing for political and economic union. 
Accession negotiations with Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom 
were the result. With the exception of Norway, the candidates ratified the accession 
treaties and became members. In the 1970s, some progressive steps were taken. The 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) was established as an instrument to coordinate 
the foreign policies of member states. Another important step was the creation of the
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European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978, which was to be the cornerstone of 
monetary cooperation. In the EMS exchange rates were stabilized for the member 
states in an attempt to decrease the rate of inflation.
The “Europessimism” of the 1970s due to economic depression led to an 
increase in protectionism and nation states wanted to act alone. The European 
Community was ineffective in dealing with the problems it faced. The 1980s began 
with the era of “European Union” {relance européenne). The draft Treaty of Altiero 
Spinelli was adopted by the European Parliament in 1984. New powers were 
established for the Union in areas such as economic, monetary, social, and foreign 
policies. The European Parliament was directly elected and the establishment of 
another chamber called the Council, where representatives of the member 
governments would be appointed, was planned but it was not ratified (Borchardt, 
1995: 12).
During the 1980s Greece, Portugal, and Spain ratified accession treaties. The 
EC would become a more economic-oriented organisation. The most important event 
of the 1980s was the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985. A single 
market without barriers would be established and cooperation on the environment, 
research, and technology was on the agenda. A single market would require better 
decision-making.
This move toward a single market gave a new direction to the Community in 
the 1990s. Two intergovernmental conferences were held to establish economic and 
monetary as well as political union. The end result was the Treaty on European 
Union signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. The Maastricht Treaty was designed 
to achieve political and monetary union. The Delors Plan for monetary union was 
accepted and it had three stages. The first stage comprised the incoiporation of all
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cLiiTencies into the EMS. In the second stage, a European network of Central Banks 
was set up, and in the third stage, a comnnon cuirency, the EURO, was to be 
introduced.
In addition, member states created a common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP). For unanimous decisions taken by the Council of Ministers, it was accepted 
that on subsequent actions a qualified majority would suffice. It was the first time 
that the principle of unanimity was eliminated on foreign and security policies. 
Furthermore the Western European Union became both part of the European Union 
and the Atlantic Alliance. The European Parliament’s role was increased; it confirms 
the Commission and has the right to establish Committees of inquiry and to receive 
petitions. Also the EP gained the right of co-decision on matters of a single market, 
consumer protection, the environment and trans-European networks.
The Maastricht summit created a new direction in regard to European foreign 
and security policy. Also, with the Maastricht summit, “Union citizenship” was 
introduced as a new concept. It was accepted to increase cooperation among the 
citizens of the member states. In addition, the power of the European Parliament was 
strengthened. The peoples of Europe have gained rights such as;
• Right to vote and stand for election to the European Parliament and in municipal 
elections irrespective of the country of residence. ( Article8/B )
• Diplomatic or consular protection in a non-member country by another Member 
State of the Union if their own Member State is not represented there.(Article8/C)
• Right to petition the European Parliament on matters coming within the 
Community’s fields of activity. (Article8/D )
(Weidenfeld and Wessels 1997: 184)
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The ratification process of the Treaty did not happen out of the blue. 
Referendums were held in France, Ireland, and Denmark. In the last instance 
Denmark’s initial opposition turned into approval, and in November 1993 the Treaty 
came into force.
But the main problem still remained; the European Community is moving 
towards the European Union. In 1995 Finland, Austria, and Sweden were accepted as 
full members but the problem of “deepening” the Union is still urgent. The number 
of states is rising and problems are rising. For example, appointing a commissioner to 
the European Commission for every country is problematic, in that larger states could 
be outvoted by the smaller ones. So there is an urgent need for better functioning 
institutions and for institutional reforms.
The EU has taken a new direction in the 1990s, following the end of the Cold 
War and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact. After the collapse of the threat from the 
USSR, ideological disputes between East and West decreased. The European states 
had tried to create a “fortress Europe” (Goodman, 1990: 1) to counter the Soviet 
threat but today the same Europe opens its door to the ex-communist states. In a 
global game, Europe was a major player and it was respected by the newly formed 
states so that the nascent states act in accordance with the wishes of Europe, signing 
accession treaties with them. But do they really fulfill the obligations set by the 
Copenhagen Criteria of the European Council? In the Council protocols it is 
mentioned that member states must have stable democracy, have a competitive 
market economy to cope with the single market, and have the ability to cope with the 
obligations set by Community Law. The political criteria for accession are: the 
candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, and respect for and protection of minorities and human rights. Whether
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the former East Bloc countries considered for membership meet these requirements is 
questionable.
Many different questions remain but the last thing I would like to mention is 
Turkey's place in the process of integration. Turkey is still waiting for the Ankara 
Agreement of 1963 to be taken seriously on the agenda of enlargement. But 
everytime Turkey knocks on the door of the EU, Turkey is politely rejected because it 
has not met the obligations set by the EU regarding democratic rule, rule of law, or a 
functioning free market economy.
In this chapter I describe attempts at European integration in the post- 
Westphalian period. When Pope Innocent X was informed about the peace of 1648 
that ended the Thirty Years War in Europe, he described the Peace as “null, void, 
invalid, unjust, damnable, reprobate, insane, empty of meaning and effect for all 
time”(McGrew, 1997; 3). In spite of this description, the world has been living with 
the concepts that emerged from the Peace of Westphalia and when “Turkey’s Thirty 
Years W ar’ will end with Europe is not clear in the minds of Turkish people.
The thought of a closer Union that had been expressed in the Treaty of Rome 
was realized with the Treaty of Maastricht. History is full of examples of rivalries 
between national actors so this creates a duality when one thinks of voluntarily 
joining a supranational organization. Supranational organizations are regarded as the 
captain of the team and the players are the nation-states which have shed blood for 
sovereignty. But now independent sovereign states are voluntarily united under 
supranational organizations, hence this may be accepted as the voluntary 
relinquishing of their sovereignty. In Kantian terms regional integration is for 
“perpetual peace’’, and for peace we must move “beyond the nation-state’’ (Mutimer,
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1994: 13). The approach seeks to describe the process of political integration over 
and beyond nation states especially in regard to the concept of sovereignty.
The various theories of integration mentioned in this chapter and their 
application to the process of unification in Europe centre around the point that 
European integration brings a transfer of sovereignty from individual states to a 
larger entity. It is within this context that Turkey has problems. On the one hand 
Turkey aspires to be a member, but on the other hand, there are certain requirements 
that come with integration that Turkey feels it can not afford. If Turkey were not in 
the European sphere of influence with a desire to be a part of European integration, 
then Turkey’s democracy would not be under so much scrutiny.
The next chapter will look at Turkey’s route to the West, its past history with the EU, 
and the changes in its relations with the West since the end of the Cold War.
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CHAPTER II
TURKEY’S: ROUTE TO THE WEST: Its Relations with Europe
In 1997, the EU effectively rejected completely the Turkish application to 
become a full member when it decided to open accession negotiations with Eastern 
and Central European countries, but not with Turkey. This thesis proposes that 
Turkey’s position in the future Europe is becoming more problematic in the post- 
Cold War era due to the transformation in Europe.
Since 1989, momentous changes have taken place in the European and global 
order. These changes directly affect Turkey’s position in that order. The world is 
entering a new era following the collapse of Soviet Union. During the Cold War, 
Turkey’s geostrategic importance to Europe and the USA was enhanced due to its 
unique location, market economy, continuous relations with the West, and large 
armed forces which make Turkey the second largest army in NATO after the USA 
(Çakar, 1998: 5). This chapter addresses the impact of the changes in the European 
order on Turkey and its place in Europe.
Because of Turkey’s pivotal location between Asia and Europe, Turkey has 
often played the role of fortress in the eyes of Europeans and the USA. This was 
especially true during the Cold War years. Turkey is a crossroads between East and 
West and it is a buffer zone in international politics. For example, Turkey supports
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the Middle East Peace Process and acts as a balancer in this region. Turkey’s role as a 
fortress is now being challenged with the changing global order.
By the end of the 1980s, Europeans’ attitudes had changed towards the non- 
Europeans affected by the diminishing of the bipolar world order. The year 1989 was 
the turning point in this regard. The dismantling of the Soviet Union and the fall of 
the Berlin Wall paved the way for deep-rooted changes in the world. A multi-power 
world has been created in place of the old bi-polar world. Europe began to interact 
with ex-communist states in order to “Europeanize” them by holding out the offer of 
inclusion in the European Union.
While trying to analyze Turkey’s situation, the historical relations between
Turkey and Europe must be taken into account. Turkey has a long history of close
relations with European countries that began in the time of the Ottoman Empire.
Huntington uses the label “tom country” (Huntington, 1993: 42), pointing out that
Turkey’s elites want to assimilate their country into the West even though in many
ways the same country is historically and culturally non-Westem. This observation
emphasizes the uniqueness of Turkey as neither East nor West but as something in
between. It is this position that makes it problematic to place Turkey in Europe.
Turkey once banged at the gates of Vienna, and is now 
knocking at the door of Brussels (Spencer, 1993: 1).
Since the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has been integrated into various
European organizations, and by doing so it has tried to emphasize its Europeanness.
In modem times, Turkey’s memberships and agreements strengthen its claims to its
place in Europe:
Member of Council of Europe since 1948 
Member of OEEC since 1948 (OECD today)
25
• Member of NATO since 1952
• Associate member of EC since 1962
• Applicant for full membership since 1987
• Signed Convention for Human Rights and additional conventions related with 
Human Rights
• Signed a Customs Union Agreement with the European Union in 1995
One should note that Turkey is the country with the longest standing associate 
status with the EU. This is an important point to draw attention to, because despite its 
long-standing association with the EU, Turkey is presently not even included among 
possible applicant countries. It is due to the changes in the European order that such a 
change in Turkey’s status has come about.
2.1. Ottoman Westernization
Since the Ottoman Empire is the predecessor of the Turkish Republic, then an 
analysis of Turkey’s relations with the EU would be incomplete without touching 
upon the Ottoman legacy. It is Ottoman rule in Europe from the 15''’ century onwards 
that shaped many Europeans’ attitudes towards modem Turkey. Thus the Ottoman 
legacy is twofold. On the one hand, Turkey has inherited many of its essential 
characteristics from the Ottoman Empire, and second, Ottoman-European relations 
have left their mark on Turco-European relations by shaping the European 
perceptions about Turks. During the period of 1300-1453, the Ottomans conquered 
not only Anatolia, but also the Balkans. The conquered territory stretched from the 
Euphrates to the Danube and from the Crimea to the Aegean Islands (İnalcık, 1997: 
80). In 1453 istanbul/Constantinople was conquered, which marked the end of the 
Byzantine Empire. During its heyday, the Ottoman Empire’s population included
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Greeks, Bulgars, Macedonians, Serbs, and many lesser ethnic groups. The Bosphorus 
Straits were under the control of Ottoman rule, which meant having great power over 
important trade routes. By the sixteenth century, Arab trade and pilgrimage routes 
were also under Ottoman control.
Trade constituted a major interaction between the Ottomans and the 
Europeans. The first Ottoman agreements were with the Genoese in 1352, and then 
Venice and Florence regarding commerce with the Levant (İnalcık, 1997: 81). The 
Ottoman Sultans then extended privileges to other countries like France and England. 
The treaties were an indication that the Ottoman Empire was a superpower in the 
East. The Ottoman Empire played a significant role in the European economy by 
contracting with Europeans as preferred trading partners. However, the influence of 
Europe on the Ottoman Empire also increased, especially with the decline of the 
Empire. Most markedly after the 17'’’ century one sees a process of Europeanization 
in the Ottoman Empire.
While the Empire was expanding through Southeast Europe, the civilization 
of the Orient was also penetrating the conquered lands and vice versa. The first 
indication of the Europeanization of the Ottoman Empire was the proclamation of the 
Tanzimat Fermanil'Dtcxtt in 1839, in which a Western type of administration was 
adopted. Secular law Courts, French style provincial administration (1864), and the 
millet system brought some fundamental rights to the Christian minorities. The 
reforms along the lines of westernization reached their peak with the declaration of a 
constitution and the formation of the parliament in 1876.
During the Tanzimat period, many foreign merchants settled along the 
Ottoman peninsula for trade. These merchants brought new technologies and 
products to the infant Ottoman industries. New machines were imported from Europe
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to build new factories for the production of cloth, headgear, rifles, shoes, and 
cartridge belts. (Ramazanoglu, 1985: 49). Even though most of the demand for these 
goods came from the state organizations and the army, the production was not 
adequate and could not even meet the demands of the domestic market.
Over time in the Ottoman economy, a new class-bourgeoisie was formed by 
the ethnic minorities (Jews, Greeks, Armenians) who held power in the market and 
this provoked a reaction in the Moslems who gradually were losing their economic 
and administrative superiority. Also, in 1856 equality before the law for all citizens 
was adapted by the Islahat Fermam/Charter which added to the westernization 
reforms of the nineteenth century.
Ottoman westernization really began in the eighteenth century. In 1795 
diplomatic missions were established in Europe (Müftüler, 1997: 16). Eventually as a 
result of this contact, France was perceived to provide the ideal type of education and 
young Turks were sent there to create a class of intelligentsia. This educated class 
imported Western civilization to Ottoman soil. A Turkish identity began to be form 
around the idea of trying to assimilate Ottoman “culture” to European “civilization”. 
Concepts like liberté, égalité, fraternité appeared after the French Revolution (1789), 
and the new educated class began to talk about these concepts even though since the 
rest of Ottoman society was still unaware of such ideas. The Ottoman Empire had a 
“strong state” mentality. The Sultan was the omnipotent ruler who took his strength 
from the Deity. Hence, there was no notion of liberty since the people were the 
subjects of the Sultan. An identity crisis began to appear since one part of society was 
talking about new Western concepts but there were not any institutions for the 
safeguarding of individual rights, liberty, or property. With the Tanzimat reforms, 
new legal rules were adopted, parliament was established and a constitution was
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proclaimed. But the Sultan and the Islamist reactionists cut off this route to 
Europeanization and parliament was closed.
Admiration of the West was also strongly seen in literature. Novels were 
written which had characters who were European as well as Ottoman. Western 
characters were portrayed as hard-working, educated, and modem and the Ottoman 
ones were depicted as living for a modest life and were uneducated. The educated 
Turks were acting as noblesse cle robe (Kachoğlu, 1996: 182) in Istanbul, ignoring the 
rest of society who represented the “folk” culture. A gap between the elite’s and the 
rest of society’s way of life led to identity clashes seen in every sphere of Ottoman 
life.
From the beginning of the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth 
century (Tanzimat period) thus we see the uneven route to Ottoman modernization. 
This brief look at the past of Ottoman-Europe relations helps us to understand that 
the identity crisis in today’s Turkey has its roots in past centuries. And, that the 
westernization process in the administrative, social, and economic spheres of life also 
began many years ago and the process continues. Europe is still the ideal, and Turkey 
is still trying to adopt its rules.
In short, the Ottoman legacy is important in regard to Turkey’s place in 
Europe, basically because it has influenced European attitudes towards Turkey until 
the present, and secondly, because it has constituted a model for Turkish 
modernization.
2.2. The New Republic’s Westernization
World War I brought the label “sick man of Europe” to the Ottoman Empire. 
The Empire was past its prime. The allied powers that the Ottomans had supported
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were defeated in World War I and Ottoman tenitory was divided among the victor 
countries.
While these victors were occupied with the rest of the world, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk declared the War of Independence (1920-1922). A Turkish Grand National 
Assembly was established inl920, on the principle that the Turkish nation held 
absolute sovereignty. It was a break with the tradition of the Ottoman Empire in that 
“the Turkish Republic, founded on Turkish nationalism, aimed to create a 
homogeneous nation-state from the ashes of the multicultural empire” (Müftüler, 
1997: 17).
Westernization policies continued during the time of Atatürk, who aimed at 
creating a secular nation-state on the European model. But his policies of 
westernization were different from the nineteenth century policies of the Ottoman 
Empire. First, the Republic was an equal in status with the European states. Second, 
European civilization was adopted as an “indivisible whole” (Müftüler, 1997: 16). 
European institutions and values were emulated regarding the newly established 
Republic.
After the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, Atatürk introduced new 
reforms. He accepted the West as the model for the new Republic. Fie felt that a 
secular nation-state had to be formed in order to be able to compete with other states 
in the international order. In order to rise to the level of the West, reforms had to be 
made.
These were the reforms of Atatürk in chronological order:
1 November 1922: 
29 October 1923:
3 March 1924:
abolition of the sultanate 
proclamation of the Republic 
abolition of the caliphate
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8 April 1924:
30 September 1925;
25 November 1925:
26 December 1925: 
17 February 1926:
1 March 1926;
28 June 1926:
10 April 1928:
3 November 1928:
8 June 1929:
16 Apnl 1930:
21 June 1934;
8 December 1934:
dissolution of the şeriat courts 
prohibition of religious orders
prohibition of the fez and of religious costumes in 
public
introduction of the West European calendar 
enactment of the civil code according to the Swiss 
model
enactment of a penal code according to the Italian 
model
enactment of the commercial code
abolition of Islam as the state religion (by changing
article 2 of the 1924 constitution)
introduction of the Latin alphabet
enactment of a law on land reform
establishment of women’s right to vote for community
councils
introduction of family names
establishment of women’s right to vote for the National 
Assembly (Endruweit, 1998: 59).
All these reforms were made in social, cultural and political areas in order to create a 
Turkish identity within its traditional heritage yet modem enough to compete with 
the Western nations.
However, during the process of creating this identity some obstacles arose, 
especially from the religious groups. As Şerif Mardin expresses it, there has always 
been center-periphery cleavage in Turkey going back to Ottoman times (Mardin,
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1973; 181). When “secularism” as a word began to be used, some people felt that 
Islam was under attack and revolts arose against westernization from Islamist groups. 
The new Turkish identity was being imposed from above throughout the society and 
this is a very difficult task.
Especially, after the Second Word War, new European institutions were 
established and generally Turkey was accepted as a member of the club for the same 
reason as had been the Ottoman Empire following the Crimean War, to deter the 
Russians. There is, therefore, a parallel between the Ottoman Empire’s integration 
into European diplomacy in 1856 and the Turkish Republic’s in 1945: to be a buffer 
against the Russians / Soviets.
During the early years of the Republic the Turkish State was protectionist. 
Thus it followed a policy of neutrality, especially during the Second World War. 
Atatürk and his Republican Peoples Party (RPP) also adopted protectionist policies 
in the economic field in the name of “eiarEm”. Etatisrn -a term meaning “statism” 
and taken directly from the French, promotes the concept of the “interventionist 
state” (Richards and Waterbury, 1990: 188). Under ttatism the Turkish State did not 
hold a monopoly in every industry, rather it tried to protect infant industries since the 
Republic was in its infancy. After World War I, high protective trade barriers kept 
foreign investment out of the national economy (Ramazanoğlu, 1985: 64) through 
import substitution industrialization (ISI). Also etatism promoted the direct economic 
activity of the state through public economic enterprises. This policy was designed to 
industrialize the country.
In the political realm, Turkey experienced single-party rule with the RPP until 
1945. Duverger states that;
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The Turkish single-party system was never based upon the doctrine 
of a single party. It gave no official recognition to the monopoly, 
made no attempts to justify it by the existence of a classless society 
or the desire to do away with parliamentary strife and liberal 
democracy. It was always embairassed and almost ashamed of the 
monopoly. The Turkish single party had a bad conscience (Özbudun,
1981: 91).
İnönü, the successor to Atatürk was then forced to liberalize the Turkish political 
system and opposition parties were formed. Transforming Turkey into a pluralist, 
multi-party democracy which is still intact (Kaipat, 1991: 59).
A turning point in Turkey’s relations with Europe came in 1945. In the early 
years of the republic, Turkey followed a neutralist policy towards Europe while it 
tried to consolidate its own political system. In 1945 however, Turkey was faced with 
a choice, and it chose to be an integral part of the European order.
2.3. Turkey During The Cold War
With the end of the Second World War, a bipolar system emerged. The Cold 
War could be stated as a war game between the two supeipowers (USA & USSR). 
The bipolar system of the balance of power and the ideological heterogeneity of the 
international arena were the key elements shaping Turkish policy (Müftüler, 1997: 
30).
After 1945, the Soviet Union demanded the revision of the Montreux 
Convention (1936) concerning the Bosphorus Straits. In addition they demanded the 
Turkish cities of Kars and Ardahan. For the security of Turkey, ties with the Western 
security system were strengthened to deter the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine 
and the Marshall Plan originating from the United States were accepted. Turkey
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became a NATO member in 1952 so as to enjoy Western Security. A key element 
shaping this decision was Soviet aggression; while at the same time NATO was 
perceived to be the bulwark of the new order to which Turkey desired to belong.
During the Cold War. Turkey took its place in the “south-eastern bastion of 
the NATO alliance” (Müftüler, 1996: 256). Turkey’s geostrategic position is very 
important since she has borders with the Balkans, the Persian Gulf and the Middle 
East. The southern flank had to be strong enough to deter the Soviet Union.
The Cold War period provided a golden opportunity for Turkish aspirations to 
be accepted as a European state. The newly emerging European institutions 
welcomed Turkey as a member because of security considerations. Turkey became a 
member of the OEEC in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, NATO in 1952, and 
an associate member of the EEC in 1963. All these memberships were aimed at 
integrating Turkey into Europe for geostrategic considerations. The grounds for 
Turkey’s inclusion, however, were shaky.
Until the 1960s, Turkey-Greece relations were not too troublesome since both 
were members of NATO and both were on the same side against the Soviet threat. 
However, relations between Greece and Turkey had never been smooth. Cyprus, the 
Aegean Islands, territorial waters, mining rights on the continental shelf, 
militarization of the islands, air space, and now Greece’s attitude toward Kurdish 
leader Abdullah Ocalan are the source of problems between the two countries.
During the years 1945 to 1960, Turkish foreign policy was pro-American. 
However, from that point on till the 1970s, Turkey’s relations with the USA changed 
in a negative way. The relations changed due to the Cyprus and Aegean Sea issues. 
President Johnson’s letter to the Turkish president (1964), and US arms embargo on 
Turkey (1975), were the two turning points in Turkey-US relations (Müftüler, 1997:
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31). On July 12, 1947 Turkey had signed an agreement on military assistance with 
the USA. After this agreement Turkey turned away from Soviet Union. In 1960, the 
President Cemal Gürsel rejected Chairman Nikita Khrushchev’s official neutrality 
request. In 1960, the London-Zurich Accord was signed between Turkey, Greece and 
the United Kingdom. The three guarantors would be responsible for the integrity of 
Cyprus. According to the agreement Cypriots would be represented in an Assembly 
in accordance with their population. However, in 1964 the Greek-Cypriot President 
declared that Cyprus was totally under the control of Greece and stated that the 
Accord was not valid. US President Johnson sent a letter to Turkish President İsmet 
İnönü warning that if Turkey attacked Cyprus, the Americans would not accept this 
and also NATO would not help Turkey in case of a Soviet attack. It was the turning 
point in Turkish foreign policy. After twenty-five years, in 1964 a Turkish foreign 
minister visited the Soviet Union. “The step indicated that Turkey no longer found 
her commitments to NATO incompatible with the development of friendly relations 
with the Soviet Union’’ (Eren, 1997: 17).
After the crisis in Cyprus, Turkey had to reformulate her foreign policy. Visits 
between Turkey and the Soviet Union on a governmental basis began. Moscow 
recognized the existence of the two communities in Cyprus and accepted the granting 
of equal rights to both (Eren, 1997: 17). On economic grounds, over one billion 
dollars of Soviet aid was received to be used in the development of the economy.
On April 17, 1972 Turkey and the Soviet Union signed a Declaration of 
Principles of Good Neighbors, which resembled the 1925 Nonaggression Pact. In this 
declaration it was stated that relations between the two countries would be in accord 
with the principles of peace, friendship, and good neighbors. The two states would
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respect the equality and sovereignty of nations, and there would be no interference in 
domestic issues, and that inviolable borders would be respected.
In 1974, a coup took place in Athens. Shortly thereafter, Sampson overthrew 
President Makarios and claimed that Cyprus was under the control of Greece. Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit went to the United Kingdom to seek a common solution to the 
problem. Even though the United Kingdom was one of the guarantors of the Cyprus 
Accord, the United Kingdom did not wish to deal with the problem. Turkey 
unilaterally intervened in Cyprus. This intervention resulted in an anns embargo 
against Turkey in 1975. As a result the Cyprus problem and relations with Greece 
became the main obstacles to Turkey’s acceptance into the EU as a full member. The 
Mitsotakis government in Athens brought the Cyprus issue into the international 
arena in order to block Turkey-EC relations (Müftüler, 1997; 33).
After the Second World War, the Western alliance was set up as a security 
bloc. The bipolar world system sought balance. Turkey played a vital role for Europe 
but especially for the United States since Turkey had borders with the Soviet Union. 
That’s why Turkey was accepted as an ally in Atlantic Europe. According to 
American containment theory Soviet communism represented a real threat and 
Turkey was a most convenient place to establish bases so as to monitor the Soviet 
Union.
So, Turkey was considered part of Europe in regard to security vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union, as a trading partner, and as an associate member of the EU since the 
1963 Ankara Agreement. Detailed information will be given in the next chapter, 
which will focus on Turkey’s internal politics, its relations with the European Union, 
and the reasons behind Turkish non-acceptance as a full member of the Union.
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2.4. Turkey's Place In The Post Cold War Era
Since 1989, a momentous transformation in Europe has been under way. The 
Cold War is over, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact dismantled. As Francis 
Fukuyama stated “history has ended.” The ideological wars are over. The dismantling 
of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall have raised reservations 
concerning the raison d'etre of NATO. NATO has lost its main enemy, the Soviets. 
New institutions have had to be created such as the North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council (NACC). This organization was created in order to increase cooperation 
within the former Warsaw Pact States. It covers the areas of defence planning, arms 
control, democratic concepts of civil-military relations, and the conversion of defence 
production to civilian purposes.
The Soviet threat is over now so policies versus ex-communist states have to 
be reorganized. Ties have to be strengthened with the Eastern European countries in 
order to import western type democracies to these newly formed autonomous states. 
The 1991 Maastricht Treaty created a new Europe, which was a move towards a 
more unified Europe in political, economic and administrative areas. The security 
policy of the EU has changed. The relations of NATO and the Western European 
Union (WEU) within the EU was reorganized to define the responsibilities of each 
institution in this new international order.
After the Maastricht summit, the European states are more closely tied under 
the new Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). In Article J.4. of the Treaty on 
European Union, it is stated that the organization desired “ the eventual framing of a 
common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” 
(Weidenfeld and Wessels, 1997: 42). Under such conditions, the Union’s policy 
could be coordinated and effective in a crisis situation. The EPC was ineffective
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during the invasion oF Kuwait and the war in Yugoslavia so to take quick action on 
matters of foreign and security policies the EU has departed from the principle of 
unanimity.
In this regard, Turkey faces a problem because even though it is a member of 
NATO, it is only an associate member of the EU, with little prospect of becoming a 
full member. If the WEU could become both part of the EU and NATO then what 
would be Turkey’s position in that manner? In the recent meeting in Sarajevo, in 
August 1999, the President of the Turkish Republic, Suleyman Demirel, made a 
speech where he stated that peace and stability in the region must be achieved. 
Turkey played a pivotal role in the crisis. Thus for security in Europe, Turkey’s role 
may still be of strategic importance.
Turkey has an important role to play in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central 
Asia, and the Middle East. Especially during the Gulf crisis Turkey’s strategic role 
was reorganized in the international arena. Turkey took sides with the allied forces 
against Iraq even though Turkey had previously maintained a policy of neutrality 
towards the Middle East. Two-thirds of the Middle East’s oil reserves would have 
been under the control of Iraq if Saddam Hüssein had been successful in his illegal 
invasion of Kuwait. Turkey’s position was costly for two reasons; i) the Kerktik- 
Yumurtalik pipeline crosses over Turkey through which Iraq exported half of its oil 
reserves, ii) Turkey operates as a transition point between Iraq and other states for 
goods (Müftüler, 1997: 40).
When the UN took its actions against Iraq, Turkey shut down the Iraqi oil 
pipeline and accepted the UN trade embargo against Iraq. “The closure of the 
pipeline, and the ending of all regular trade with Iraq, was undoubtedly a vital 
element in the economic campaign against Saddam. Without Turkish co-operation.
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any effective embargo would have been quite impossible” (Müftüler, 1997: 40). 
Turkey lost $30 billion dollars by shutting down the pipelines. Turkish President 
Turgut Özal cooperated with the United States and Turkish bases were allowed to be 
used for allied air operations. The NATO allies pledged to help Turkey if there were 
an attack from Iraq. NATO forces were deployed for the security of Turkey. Former 
U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pointed out the role of Turkey in the Gulf, as 
follows:
Turkey, though somewhat removed geographically, is central to Gulf 
Strategy. Looking toward Iran and Iraq on one set of frontiers and 
toward Europe on another, Turkey has been the anchor of our 
Mediterranean policy....It will not be possible to sustain the stability 
of the Gulf indefinitely without the effective support of Turkey...To 
seek stability in the Gulf against both Iran and Iraq simultaneously, 
with vulnerable Saudi Arabia, our only ally, is a high risk policy.
Dealing with Saddam Hussein presents insuperable problems; Iran 
would be the logical candidate for a rapprochement, but so far there 
has not been a shred of evidence that Iran is prepared to abandon its 
support for teiTorism. Fortunately there are not comparable obstacles 
in dealing constructively with Turkey. It is high time to treat Turkey 
in a manner compatible with its strategic importance. (Turkey and 
European Integration, 1997: 19).
The Gulfwar was an important event in terms of Turkey’s relation with the West. 
Turkey changed its neutrality policy regarding the Middle East by taking part in the 
allied effort against Iraq. The crisis was a test for Turkey to prove how stable it is and 
how important it is for restoring peace in the Middle East, and it passed this test 
successfully.
Another important project for Turkey is the construction of a major pipeline 
from Baku, Azarbaijan, to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan (Turkey and
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European Integration, 1997: 21). Caspian Sea oil will cross through Turkey, so the 
West will benefit from Caspian oil through the help of Turkey. Strategically, this is 
vitally important in that "Oil from the Caucasus and Central Asia may be treated as 
an independent source of energy only to the extent that it can be delivered to world 
markets independently of the Middle East and Russian oil-supply systems” (Turan, 
1998; 25).
On February 3, 1992, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, 
Rumania, Russia, Turkey, and the Ukraine signed the Istanbul Declaration as the 
final document for the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Project (BSECP). With this 
declaration member states agreed to cooperate for economic improvement. The 
BSECP was organized by Şükrü Elekdağ (former Turkish Ambassador to the United 
States) under Turkish leadership in the Black Sea region. The aims of the agreement 
are: establishing and maintaining free market economies, establishing effective 
mechanisms for better economic cooperation, to be good neighbors, respect for the 
sovereignty of each member state and promotion of CSCE/OSCE principles to 
resolve any conflict in the region.
Since Turkey has ethnic links with many of the ex-communist states, it is 
thought that Turkey could be the Western model for these states with its market 
economy and secular democracy. With the establishment of the Economic Co­
operation Organization (ECO), Turkey could have the possibility for regional 
leadership. Turkey is very important for the West because of its potential influence in 
the region. But on the other hand, Iran and Russia are the other countries which seek 
regional leadership in these areas which brings Turkey into potential conflict with 
these countries.
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Relations with the Balkans potentially contribute to Turkey’s status. 
Nowadays the Balkans are very unstable and Turkey is seeking closer ties with these 
states. During the crisis in Yugoslavia, Turkey insisted on recognition of the Bosnian 
people’s rights. Then in 1992 Turkey recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, 
Crotia, and Macedonia as independent sovereign states. War in Bosnia reached its 
peak in 1993 and UN resolutions concerning Yugoslavia were ineffective. In 
November 1992 representatives of ten Balkan and European states met in Turkey to 
find a common solution to the Bosnian crisis. It was agreed that UN observers should 
be deployed in Bosnia (Müftüler, 1997: 49). But the UN lost its credibility in the 
Bosnian crisis since attacks by Serbs could not be prevented and the West turned to a 
NATO attack in the form of air strikes.
Turkey is trying to find a place for itself in the “New Global Order”. Turkey 
is accepted as a model for restoring democracy and free markets in the Balkans since 
Turkey has cultural ties in this region. The policy of neutrality towards disputes 
between two or more states adopted in the early years of the newly fomaed Turkish 
Republic has drastically changed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, instability 
prevalent in that region has become a very serious problem. American deputy 
Secretary of State Talbott stated that “the emergence of stable, prosperous, 
democratic and law-abiding nations along your borders can only benefit Turkey” 
(Talbott, 1995). So as a result Turkey and Western Europe share common security 
concerns.
The following section analyzes the historical development of Turkey’s 
relations with the European Union from 1963 to the present.
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2.5. Turkey and the EU 1963-1999
14 April 1987 was the date of a new beginning for Turkish-EU relations when 
Turkey applied for full membership in the European Union. In article 237 of the 
Rome Treaty, it is stated as "any European country may apply to become a member 
of the Community”. Based on this statement both Greece and Turkey applied for 
associate membership in 1959.
Turkey’s European identity is questioned even though Turkey is a member of 
the OECD (1949), the Council of Europe (1949), and NATO (1952). In addition, it 
has cultural, social, and political ties to the Europeans.
In 1960, when EC-Greek relations began officially, it was stated that Turkey 
was not ready for membership. In that same year, the military took over the 
government which was seen as a good reason for the EC not beginning negotiations 
with Turkey. Despite that setback, the Ankara Treaty was signed on 12 September 
1963, and came into force on I December 1964. This Agreement aimed to promote 
trade and economic relations with the goal of improving the Turkish economy, 
employment, and the living standards of the Turkish people (Official Journal of the 
European Communities, 1977). The Association Agreement consisted of three stages; 
the prepatory, the transitional and the final stage. During the prepatory stage Turkey 
would get economic aid from the Community in order to strengthen its economy. 
This stage was to last five years but was open to change under conditions set in the 
Provisional Protocol.
The transitional stage was a step further in the relationship. Both parties 
would establish a customs union and Turkey would be prepared for the adoption of 
the Common External Tariff (CET). At the end of this stage, there could be an 
increase in the circulation of some industrial and agricultural products, capital.
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goods, and services. The second stage was foreseen to last from twelve to twenty-two 
years.
The final stage would be based on closer cooperation between the two parties 
when Turkey fulfilled the obligations set by the Community. Then, the way to full 
membership would be open.
The prepatory stage lasted for seven years, and ended in 1970. An additional 
Protocol was added to the Ankara Agreement, which was signed on 23 November 
1970 and came into force on 1 January 1973.
In 1971 there was another coup. In addition to this setback, at about the same 
time, the State Planning Organization (SPO) and the Foreign Ministry began to 
disagree about EC membership. The SPO insisted association would damage 
economic development, while on the other hand the Foreign Ministry supported 
accession, feeling that it would improve economic and political standards in Turkey.
Until 1981, relations with the EC had been improving but after another 
military coup d ’état in Turkey relations were frozen. The Fourth Financial Protocol 
was temporarily blocked. After turning back to civilian government in 1983, 
negotiations began to be normalised with the EC. Thus, this transition stage lasted 
twenty-two years until a customs union agreement between Turkey and the EC was 
ratified on 31 December 1995. According to this protocol, Turkey had to reduce its 
production of industrial goods. The help of these two-sided reductions would adopt 
CET of the community to Turkey while trading with third parties.
The 1970s were crisis years for Turkey and Europe. France and Italy were 
against the implementation of the CAP policy of the EC applied to Turkey. Turkey’s 
exports of agricultural goods to the EC would be increased and they believed that this
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would harm their farmers. In addition, because of the Community’s Mediteiranean 
Policy, preferential treatment for Turkish goods were annulled.
In 1973, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EC as new 
members. A year later the Cyprus crisis erupted. Greece applied for full membership 
in 1975. Greece was accepted by the EC based on the proposition that the EC would 
be a stabiliser for democracy in Greece. After Joining the EC as a full member the 
influence of Greece on EC policy increased markedly.
When the EPC was developed to create a special zone for the member states 
to co-ordinate foreign policies, Turkey realized that it was becoming increasingly 
more difficult to eventually become a part of the EC. In order to decrease Turkey’s 
complains about Greek lobbying in the Community, the 'troika' formula was created. 
'Troika’ means that the country holding the European Council presidency along with 
its successor and predecessor would all be informed on the issues which concern 
Turkey.
At the beginning of the 1980s, Turkish authorities planned to make a formal 
application to the EC but this was cut off by another military take over on September 
12,1980, and relations between the two parties were once again frozen. Plowever, a 
civilian government was formed in 1982 and relations began to be normalised after 
the meeting of the Association Council. By 1986, the Prime Minister of Turkey, 
Turgut Özal, targeted EC membership as part of his political agenda. As a result, a 
program of economic liberalization was adopted to prepare and modernise the 
economy of Turkey (Müftüler, 1997; 63).
On 14 April 1987, Turkey officially submitted its bid for membership in the 
Community. But the Commission gave a negative answer on 18 December 1989, 
indicating that it was not proper to open negotiations with Turkey. The Commission
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put forward both economic and political reasons, among other things, citing the 
dispute between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus issue. However, in addition to 
this, the Commission stated that “this Community has a fundamental interest in 
intensifying its relations with Turkey and helping it to complete as soon as possible 
the process of political and economic modemisation”(Turkey’s Progress Report, 
1998).
As a result, on 7 June 1990, the Mattutes Package was put forward which 
included the completion of a customs union, industrial and technology cooperation 
and strengthened political and cultural ties. However, the Council did not approve 
these proposals.
In 1991 Turkey signed an agreement with the EFTA countries for free trade in 
industrial products, processed agricultural products, and fish. A year later, the EC and 
the EFTA countries signed the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement aimed at 
creating a global market. As a result, Turkish markets automatically opened to the 
EEA. On November 20, 1992, Turkey was accepted as an associate member of the 
WEU. This was an important step for Turkey since the WEU became part of both the 
EU and NATO by the decisions taken at the Maastricht summit.
Then on March 6, 1995, the Customs Union Agreement was signed between 
the European Union and Turkey. The final decision came into force on 31 December, 
1995. However, a parliamentary resolution of 19 September 1996 called for the 
Commission to block the MEDA program concerning Turkey, except for the 
provision dealing with the promotion of democracy, human rights, and strengthening 
civil society.
On 15 July 1997, the Agenda 2000 was adopted which proposed that the EU 
should have closer relations with Turkey in order to resolve Turkey’s problems
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concerning human rights, the rule of law, and the Cyprus issue. The Luxembourg
European Council of December 1997 proposed:
To prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the 
European Union in every field ...development of the possibilities 
afforded by the Ankara Agreement, intensification of the Customs 
Union, implementation of financial cooperation, approximation of 
laws and adoption of the Union acquis', panicipation should be 
decided case by case, in certain programs...(Turkey and European 
Integration, 1997; 21).
Turkey reacted to the decisions of the European Council by suspending political 
dialogue between the two parties. Turkey continued relations only in regard to the 
Association Agreement, the Additional Protocol, and the Customs Union.
A ‘European Strategy for Turkey’ was prepared and discussed at the Cardiff 
European Council of June 1998, proclaiming that relations between the EU and 
Turkey should be more concerned with taking Turkey’s perspective into account. As 
a response to the Cardiff European Council, the Commission prepared financial 
support of 15 million ECU to improve the EC-Turkey customs union for 1999-2001, 
and 135 million ECU for social and economic development in Turkey for 1999-2001.
However, recent improvements in relations between Turkey and the EU have 
again been sabotaged by the Greek veto. In June 1999, the Heads of State and 
Government of EU countries met in Cologne. Turkey’s accession to the Union was 
on the agenda but at the final meeting, due to the success of Greek lobbying Turkey 
was again ignored. The ultimate support of France and Germany could not counter 
Greece because Greece insisted that Cologne was not intended as an enlargement 
meeting. The issue of enlargement of the EU is to be discussed at the Helsinki 
summit. Turkey was disappointed, but Gerard Schroder, the Prime Minister of
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Germany, stressed that he had a proposed plan designed to judge Turkey under the 
same standard with the other countries waiting for accession by eliminating human 
rights and democratization issues (Özalp and Aktan, 1999: 19). Turkey is still being 
told that a program is being organized regarding the countries which are presently 
members of NATO but non-members of the EU. But, it is uncertain when this will be 
realized.
To sum up, Turkey-EU relations have had their ups and downs since their 
beginning in 1963. 36 years have passed since the establishment of Turkish 
association status. During that time period Turkey and the EU have not come closer; 
the Turkish position vis-ci-vis the EU has become rockier. Turkey at the end of the 
20'  ^ century is left waiting in line for membership behind a number of Central and 
Eastern European countries.
The next chapter focuses on the state of democracy and human rights 
violations in Turkey as a visible obstacle which prevents closer ties with the 
European system of states.
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CHAPTER III
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN TURKEY: An Obstacle
To Turkey’s Membership to the EU
In this chapter, I would like to focus on the obstacles blocking Turkish 
membership in the EU. Despite Turkish attempts at full membership, the EU regards 
Turkish membership as a remote possibility. A major reason for this is the Turkish 
political system and its shortcomings.
The EU rejects Turkey’s pleas for full membership for the time being for a 
number of reasons; problems with the recognition of the Kurdish people, the Cyprus 
issue and the ongoing dispute with a member country (Greece), human rights 
violations and democratic instability. I will focus on one set of reasons, human rights 
and democracy.
At the end of the millennium, the European Union is enlarging to include 
Central and Eastern European states. The EU is working on accession treaties with 
the ex-communist states in order to preserve democracy, human rights, and free- 
markets in these countries with the ultimate aim of creating a new ally against any 
threat toward peace. On the other hand, Turkey is trying to be included in this wave 
of enlargement, but she has not been accepted due to her incompatible differences 
regarding the essential articles of the European Union acquis comiminautaire.
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Turkey has been excluded from the new wave of EU enlargement. The EU 
states that Turkey’s political system and human rights violations are some of the 
reasons behind this exclusion. Turkey is thought of as a violator of human rights. 
Thus when she wants to enter the European Union, she is reminded that due to the 
violation of human rights, she will not be allowed to be part of the civilized Western 
world. Especially on the issue of minority rights, Turks are labelled as a violator of 
human rights for not recognizing Kurdish identity. In addition, the 1982 Constitution 
which is regarded as a restrictive force concerning fundamental rights, puts Turkey in 
the bottom echelon of states in respect to human rights. Turkey has an image in the 
West of a country where in the last three decades there have been three coups, where 
the government generally has to consult the military before it acts, and a state which 
can not solve the Turkish-Kurdish problem. But one can argue that, it is too simple to 
place blame without looking at the root problem. I would like to look at how the 
human rights process began in the world, where Turkey's place is in this process, and 
what kind of violations have taken place in the country especially after the 
consolidation of the 1982 Constitution. In addition, I will focus on the Kurdish issue 
from the human rights perspective. Furthermore, I will look at specific cases, 
reported by Western scholars and journalists which portray Turks as brutal. The 
perception of Turkey in the eyes of Europeans on human rights violations will be 
explained from the views of “others-Westemers”. I use the word perception since 
perceptions are more influential than realities, especially if the perceived country can 
not argue its own case adequately.
Thus, I will first look at the evolution of human rights; second I will focus on 
Turkey’s shortcomings; and third I will point out the Turkish problems vis-ci-vis the 
EU with regard to the respect for human rights.
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3.1. Development of Human Rights
After World War II, there was an increased effort at finding ways to protect 
individual rights and liberties. The abuses that took place in World War II were 
thought to be due to a lack of having regulatory mechanisms which would prevent 
human right abuses and punish those who are capable of doing such. Thus, a number 
of institutions took up the task of creating international regimes for the protection of 
human rights. The first institution to do so was the United Nations.
When the UN Charter was signed by fifty-one states in San Francisco, it was 
only fifty days after the end of the Second World War. In 1945 the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was prepared by the UN General Assembly to be 
adopted by the organization in Paris on 10 December 1948. The main aim was the 
protection of fundamental freedoms and rights of individuals against oppression by 
states.
A second mechanism for the protection of human rights was the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, which 
entered into force in 1953 (Duparc, 1993: 7). It was stated in the convention that 
justice and peace are best maintained by “an effective political democracy” and “a 
common understanding and observance of human... rights” (Duparc, 1993: 7). 
Individuals, non-governmental organizations, or groups of individuals who think that 
their rights were violated could lodge “individual” petitions against a particular 
Member State (Duparc, 1993: 7). Turkey signed the Convention in 1954. The rights 
stated in the convention and in the current Turkish constitution are as follows:
• Rights to life. Convention (Article 2) (Gölcüklü and Gözübüyük, 1994: 8) -  
Turkish Constitution G982) Article 17 “everyone shall enjoy the right to live and 
pursue improvement of himself/herself physically and morally” (Dodd, 1983: 98).
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• Everyone has the right to be free from torture, ill treatment, and no one shall be 
subject to degrading punishment incompatible with human dignity (Convention 
Article 3 -Turkish Constitution (1982) Article 17/3. (Gölcüklü and Gözübüyük, 
1994; 8).
• Everyone has the right to personal liberty and security (Convention Article 5 -  
Turkish Constitution (1982) Article 19).
The European Convention on Human Rights was expanded with the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In 1973, the Helsinki Final Act was 
adopted which states that “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief)” -is essential. fDuparc, 1993: 9). 
Different kinds of treaties or declarations have been signed between nation states, 
especially between European states, to safeguard the preservation of human rights. 
Every agreement mentions the importance of democracy, human rights, and rule of 
law again and again.
Some examples;
• Paris Summit Declaration (1972) Signatory states would work for the 
development of democracy, freedom of opinion, free dissemination of ideas.
• Document On European Identity (1973) Signatory states would cooperate to 
establish a “European identity” respectful of the needs of the individual, 
democracy, rule of law, social justice, human rights.
• Joint Declaration on Fundamental rights (1977) Signatory states declare that 
human rights and fundamental freedoms are protected and states will continue to 
respect these.
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• Declaration On Democracy (1978) Signatory states declare that maintenance of 
representative democracy with respect for human rights in every member State is 
the main essential to be a member of the European Community.
• Single European Act (1986) Democracy, protection of human rights were on the 
agenda again.
• Declaration Against Racism and Xenophobia (1986) Signatory states declare that 
hostility against persons or groups due to racial, religious, cultural, or national 
differences would be condemned.
• Statement on Human Rights (1986) Signatory states declare that to establish 
long-lasting peace and security, universal enjoyment of human rights is essential.
• Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 11989) All fundamental rights 
were elaborated (right to life, liberty, security, equality before law, freedom of 
assembly, movement, opinion, thought, abolition of death penalty etc.).
• Resolution on the Fight Against Racism and Xenophobia (1990)
• Declaration On Anti-Semitism. Racism and Xenophobia (1990)
• Declaration On Human Rights (1991)
• Resolution On Human Rights, Democracy and Development (1991)
• Declaration On Racism and Xenophobia (1991)
• Treaty On European Union (1992)
In Article F of the Treaty on European Union it was stated that:
1- The Union shall respect Member States whose systems of government are based 
on democracy.
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2- The Union shall respect fundamental rights, which are under the guarantee of
European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1950). (Duparc, 1993: 58).
The First Protocol on Human Rights was adopted in 1954 and was accepted by 
Turkey. The Fourth Protocol concerning the right to travel and choose residence 
freely was signed in 1963 and put into force in 1968. Turkey first signed the Fourth 
Protocol in 1994. Both in the protocol and in the 1982 Constitution of Turkey it is 
stated that citizens may not be deprived of the right of entrance to their homeland and 
may not be deported. The Sixth Protocol, which abolishes the death penalty, was put 
in force since 1985, but Turkey has not ratified it. In addition Turkey has not ratified 
the Seventh protocol, which concerns the rights of foreigners. However, the most 
important agreement regarding Turkey was her acceptance of the individual right to 
appeal to the Human Rights Commission in 1987. This right was defined by 
additional protocols adopted in 1990, 1992, and 1996 stating that the Turkish 
Republic would accept the petitions sent to the Commission if these were related to 
actions or negligence within the national borders of Turkey (Gölcüklü and 
Gözübüyük, 1994: 44).
Thus one can see that Turkey has signed a number of important conventions on 
human rights, but on the other hand it has been questioned whether the rights 
established in these conventions have been implemented in Turkey or not.
After being granted the right to appeal to the Fluman Rights Commission, Turkish 
citizens began to send petitions to the Commission. These kind of cases were seen 
especially after the closure of the Kurdish parties (DEP-Democracy Party and FFEP- 
People’s Labour Party) whose members were taken into custody (ie. After the ban of 
the Kurdish Party, DEP). In 1992 the People’s Labour Party -  Halkın Emek Partisi
53
(HEP) was closed with the accusation that this party was supporting the separatist 
terrorist organization, the PKK. HEP parliamentarians with the exception of Fehmi 
Işıklar, resigned before the closure decision and founded the Democratic Party, the 
DEP. The DEP faced a similar fate in 1994, when the Constitutional Court again 
decided that this party was supporting the PKK. The DEP parliamentarians were 
taken into custody and some of them are still in prison. In response to their arrest, a 
number of DEP parliamentarians, among them Leyla Zana took their case to the 
European Court of Human Rights. Leyla Zana, who was a member of the Turkish 
Parliament and the DEP, appealed to the European Human Rights Commission 
(EHRC). The Constitutional Court’s allegations are based on the argument that these 
parties were fomred for the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish state in Eastern 
Anatolia and the parties were closed due to engaging in separatist actions against the 
integrity of the Turkish state and its territory. Such cases damage Turkey’s position 
in Europe because they are taken as proof that Turkish democracy is still far behind 
European standards.
I would like to give a brief outline regarding what Europeans were doing for 
human rights in order to make a comparison between Turkey and Europe. In the 
following pages Turkish experiences in this regard will be put forward in order to 
highlight where Turkey is considered to be acting properly or improperly. 
Additionally, the Turkish-Kurdish issue will be explained through case studies to 
illustrate the post-1980 period in Turkey.
3.2. Experience of Human Rights in Turkey
To understand the problem of human rights in Turkey, one should first 
analyze the Ottoman Empire and its legacy. The Ottoman State had a strong state
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tradition and civil society was weak. Society was subject to the Sultan and had no 
right to intervene in state affairs. In order to look at the historical development of the 
human rights issue from the Ottoman period, one should begin with the Contractual 
Agreement of 1808 (Senecl-i ittifak). Sened-i ittifak was accepted as the first 
impressive attack on the limitless power of the Sultan. It was an agreement between 
the central governing authorities and A_ya/i (kind of a senate). Especially, protection 
of the non-Moslem, and the poorer classes were on the agenda. Abolition of 
excessive taxation, and torture and punishment without investigation were the main 
points in this agreement.
A major development with respect to human rights in the Ottoman period was
the Tanzimat Charter issued in 1839. During the period of Tanzimat (1839), 
limitations on central authorities, the right to a fair and open trial, life, property 
security, abolition of unlawful seizure, fair taxation, equality of subjects before the 
law regardless of their ethnicity were introduced. Another milestone was the 
acceptance of the 1876 Constitution in the Meşrutiyet era. In the 1876 Constitution, a 
bicameral legislature was introduced; yet the Sultan was still powerful enough to 
control the administration. On the other hand, the basic rights of the Ottoman 
subjects were under the control of the constitution. The basic rights of individuals 
were freedom of religion, freedom of education, right to equality before the law, right 
to pay fair taxes imposed only by law, right to property, right to form a partnership, 
immunity from arbitrary seizure, and freedom from torture. This constitutional era
did not survive long and eventually Sultan Abdlilhamit fell from power. Against the 
Sultan’s illegal actions, opposition groups arose like the Young Turks Committee for 
Union and Progress, which insisted on ideas taken from the French Revolution, ie. 
liberté, fraternité, égalité. These movements resulted in the establishment of the
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Second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908. Sultan Abdiilhamit was deposed after the 
suppression of an anti-constitutional rebellion on March 31, 1909. Freedom of 
expression, the right to a press without censorship, and the right to form associations 
were reestablished. Within this new form of government, the Committee of Union 
and Progress became the dominant party.
The downfall of the Committee of Union and Progress came with World War 
I. The Ottoman Empire took part in World War I and was among the losers, after 
which the territory of the Empire was portioned among the Western allies. In 
response, Mustafa Kemal started the War of Independence (1912-22). Defence of 
Rights .Societies, which were dispersed over the country, were united for one aim- 
independence in order to mobilize society. The War of Independence ended with the 
establishment of a new Turkish Republic.
The period between 1924 and 1945 was marked by a single-party system. 
Fundamental rights were part of the 1924 Constitution but they were limited. 
Freedoms of speech and association were limited. Pluralism was not tolerated as the 
ultimate aim was the preservation of political stability and modernization. For this 
the system under the dominant Republican Peoples Party (RPP) is perceived as 
representative of an authoritarian model, but one which still tried to protect the basic 
rights of individuals while limiting those rights. This authoritarianism was defended 
as necessary to achieve modernization; the choice of the party was between stability 
and democracy, and stability was chosen.
Turkey is a different testground for democracy. It has a history of three 
military coups (1960, 1971 and 1980). During the period between 1923-1945, there 
was no real democracy in the newly formed Turkish Republic. The Republican 
People’s Party was founded in 1923. At the beginning of the formation of the new
56
regime there were no formal opposition political parties. But at the same time, there 
was opposition in the Assembly to Mustafa Kemal. After the formation of the 
Republican People’s Party, the Progressive Republican Party (1924) was established 
as an opposition party by the generals who took part in the War of Independence with 
Mustafa Kemal. However, after the revolt of Sheikh Said in the Eastern part of 
Anatolia, the “Law for the Maintenance of Order” was passed which gave 
extraordinary powers to the government. From then on. Martial law was declared and 
the Independence Tribunals were created (Özbudun, 1981; 81). The Progressive 
Republican Party was closed based on the position it took during the Sheikh Said 
revolt. Samuel Huntington considered the RPP period as an example of an 
“exclusionary one party system” which means that the party is both used for 
mobilization of society and also for restricting political activity (Özbudun, 1981: 
94).
Until 1945, there was not a substantial degree of social pluralism in Turkey, 
even though in the 1930s political pluralism had been encouraged by the RPP. 
Etatism as an economic policy was being debated in the Assembly (Özbudun, 1981; 
96). A close friend of Mustafa Kemal established the Free Republican Party which 
proposed more liberal economic policies. Although this party was created with 
Mustafa Kemal’s encouragement, when the Free Party started to gain public support, 
Mustafa Kemal withdrew his support and consequently the party dissolved.
In its infancy, the Turkish Republic was concerned with protecting itself from 
reactionary forces, until it became stronger. In 1945, the Turkish President, İsmet 
İnönü allowed the fomiation of opposition parties . Fifteen parties were founded and 
the Democratic Party (DP) won the 1950 elections. The elections were based on the
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“secret ballot - open count” principle. These elections constituted a turning point in 
Turkey because the RPP lost political power after twenty seven years of rule.
The Democratic Party adopted a policy of liberal economics. However, 
despite its promise not to use Islam for political support, the DP began to capitalize 
on Islam especially in periods of economic hardship. As opposition to the DP grew 
in Turkey, specifically in the second half the 1950s, the DP began to restrict basic 
rights and freedoms. The Press Law was tightened, and opposition parties were not 
allowed to use State radio or television, though the party in power had the right to 
use them (Saribay, 1991: 126). Forming coalitions of opposition parties was banned,- 
civil servants, university professors, and judges were forced to retire or exiled 
arbitrarily.
Adnan Menderes, the Prime Minister and leader of the DP, declared that “the 
radio was not a common property and it would not be shared with the opposition 
parties” (Sanbay, 1991: 126). This attitude is incompatible with democracy and 
human rights. In addition, the DP formed a Parliamentary Investigation Committee 
composed of only DP deputies which aimed to investigate opposition activities. The 
relations between the opposition and the government worsened at the end of the 
1950’s when arbitrary actions of the DP, especially against freedom of press and 
expression, were at an apex and the military felt that these conflicts had to be 
stopped. The National Unity Committee, comprised of military officials, overthrew 
the government on May 27 1960 and parliament was dissolved. Leaders of the former 
government and members of parliament were put on trial. The trials of the members 
of the parliament were in violation of the principles of human rights, democracy, and 
rule of law. The military was attempting to restore democracy and human rights 
while at the same time violations of rights were being committed by the military
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authorities regarding the politicians. Eventually a new constitution was proclaimed in 
1961. Thus v;e see that an important factor that led to the 1960 military takeover was 
the DP’s violation of human rights. Despite the hopes that they would protect civil 
liberties, the Democratic Party’s performance was disappointing. Ironically, the 
military stepped in to secure protection of human rights.
However, this short term coup turned bloody. The Prime Minister, Adnan 
Menderes and two of his ministers were hanged, there were twelve other commuted 
death sentences, and over two hundred persons, including many deputies, were 
given prison sentences (Dodd, 1983: 9). These actions are widely regarded as having 
violated the fundamental rights of individuals.
After the coup, a constituent assembly was formed to prepare a new 
constitution. This constitution was successfully submitted to a referendum. 
However, Turkish democracy was faced with ideological divisions after the 
proclamation of the 1961 Constitution, which provided social, political, and civil 
liberties. Trade Unions were formed which were generally leftist. In the 1960s, 
Turkish society began to be polarized into “left” and “right.” This paved the way for 
violence in the streets and the universities. The leftist movements became more 
radical day by day. The apex was reached on the 16th February 1969, when two 
persons were killed and sixty injured in a right / left clash in which the workers also 
took part. It was called “Bloody Sunday” in Istanbul. The rightist/leftist clashes had 
got out of hand by the end of the 1960s, leading to a military intervention which took 
place on 12th March 1971. After the coup, some restrictions were incorporated into 
the 1961 Constitution. Rights were restricted such as freedom of the press, autonomy 
of radio and television, the right of civil servants to form unions, and the autonomy
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of the universities. Thus it seems that the liberal nature of the 1961 Constitution was 
thought to be the cause of the rise of radicalism and polarization during the 1960s.
Turkey then entered to its third trial era of democratic government which 
lasted from 1973 to 1980. During these years, the People’s Party (Bülent Ecevit), the 
Justice Party (Süleyman Demirel), the Nationalist Action Party (Alparslan Türkeş) 
and the National Salvation Party (Necmettin Erbakan) were dominant. Short-lived 
coalitions were the rule and there were still economic problems (inflation, 
unemployment, budget deficits). Also, in 1974, Turkey was faced with the Cyprus 
problem, and relations with the USA were frozen. The 1970s were marked by 
polarization, fragmentation, and political violence. Incidents took place such as when 
1500 workers of the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions (DISK) 
occupied a state factory as a reaction to the dismissal of 700 left-oriented workers, 
demonstrating the social unrest which resulted from economic hardship. The Turkish 
state was faced with leftist, Kurdish, and religious challenges. The extent of political 
violence is demonstrated by constant public uprisings, political assasinations, and 
bombings. The offices of the Justice Party were bombed. The former prime minister 
Nihat Erim, and Kemal Türkler -  head of the Metal Worker’s Union and chairman of 
DISK, were killed (Dodd, 1983: 9).
Anarchy reached such a level that the government was unable to control its 
own bureaucrats. For example, the left-wing mayor of Fatsa on the Black Sea coast, 
declared that it was free from national govermental control. On the other hand, 
Abdullah Öcalan formed a separarist organization, the PKK, with the aim of forming 
a separate state for Kurds. Finally, the rise of radical Islam constituted a political 
challenge. National Salvation Party supporters held a meeting in Konya and 
called for the re-introduction of Şeriat ( Islamic Law);
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The 1970s witnessed the rise of radicalism, increased economic problems, 
political violence and anarchy. According to govermental statistics, deaths from 
political violence were as follows; 1975 ; 35, 1976 : 90, 1977 : 260, 1978 : 800 -  
1000, 1979 : 1500, 1980 : 3500 (Dodd, 1983: 27). This violence can be traced to the 
extreme polarization in Turkish society which was faced with nationalist, Islamist, 
rightist and leftist movements exacerbated by the high level of economic problems 
in the country. The governments that were in power were unable to stop the violence, 
provide public order, and sustain rule of law. Anarchy became the rule of the game.
Even such sectors as the police, responsible for law and order, were 
politicized. Ideologically diverse trade unions presented their own political parties. 
DISK is closer to the left, the Confederation of Nationalist Workers’ Union (MISK) 
supported the Nationalist Action Party, and MAKİŞ is the basis for the National 
Salvation Party. Thus, the road to another military takeover was paved. On 12 
September 1980, another coup was organized by high ranking military officers. 
Parties were closed down, trade unions which were party oriented were closed, and 
the leaders of the parties were placed under house arrest or taken into custody. 
“18,000 civil servants are reported to have received administratitive or penal 
punishments” (Dodd, 1983: 45), to depoliticize the bureaucracy. Many people were 
arrested and teiTorists were hunted down. It was reported that 80,000 left-wing 
militants were in prison, that 30,000 were waiting for trial and eventually twenty 
death sentences were carried out (Dodd, 1983: 45).
To sum up, Turkish democracy went through ups and downs after the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic. We can see that the 1961 Constitution (1961- 
71) placed a great deal of emphasis on democratic government, rule of law, and 
human rights. Fundamental rights and freedoms were protected. Protection of the
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family, property, freedom of work and contracts, the right to establish trade unions, 
right to strike, social security as a social right, all were incorporated in this 
constitution. In addition, in order to prevent arbitrary use of power, a Constitutional 
Court was established to rule on the constitutionality of laws and the Standing Orders 
of Turkish Grand National Assembly. This process was halted during the 1971-73 
period. The government was dissolved by the military and then amendments to the 
constitution were made concerning basic rights and freedoms; they could be 
restricted by law to protect the integrity of the state, to maintain public order, and to 
protect national security. During the late 1970s, renewed political instability, 
restriction of civil liberties, the creation of military martial law courts, and the 
polarization of the public into right and left paved the way for the 1980 coup. During 
this time period unjust laws and abuses were made to human rights. After the coup, 
the National Security Council (NSC) was established under the presidency of General 
Kenan Evren. The government and political parties were abolished and the military 
held power in order to safeguard the integrity of the country. A Constituent Assembly 
was established which was composed of the NSC and a Consultative Assembly; the 
NSC held power in preparation for a new Constitution.
The new Constitution was adopted by a referendum in 1982. There are 
significant differences between the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions, especially regarding 
freedom of expression. The 1982 Constitution brought the following changes: First, 
the right of trade unions and associations to demonstrate was restricted. Second, 
freedom to form associations with a political purpose and to form political parties 
was restricted (Dodd, 1983: 72). In regard to economic rights, political activities of 
unions were banned. The right to strike was accepted up to sixty days but it was 
forbidden in places where more than ten persons were employed. The power of the
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President was strengthened, and the Council of Ministers was allowed to declare a 
state of emergency in times of crisis while parliament could alter the period but was 
not allowed to cancel the state of emergency (Dodd, 1983: 72). These are some 
examples showing how the 1982 Constitution restricted the fundamental rights of 
people.
The military showed its power and influence in Turkish politics three times 
from 1960 to 1980. In every intervention some restrictions were placed upon the 
fundamental rights of people as rights are understood according to the Universal 
Human Rights Declaration. For the EU lack of democracy and violations of human 
rights were accepted as the main problems concerning Turkey.
In the Universal Human Rights Declaration, it is stated that:
• Everyone has the right of respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. (Article 8)
• Freedom of thought, conscience and religion. (Article 9)
• Freedom of expression, freedom of opinion. (Article 10)
• Law shall protect everyone’s right to life. (Article 2)
• Abolition of the death penalty. (Protocol No. 6- Article 1)
• No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment. (Article 3)
• Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law. (Article 6.2)
• Right to a fair trial (Article 6)
• These right and freedoms must be secured without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
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social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status 
(Article 14)
Turkey has been generally condemned due to the violation of human rights at 
every meeting of European organizations. After all, Turkey was not accepted for full 
membership in the European Union for this same reason. The lack of protection of 
human rights in Turkey constitutes the main obstacle to Turkey’s integration into 
Europe and various European organizations ,one of which is the EU.
The Copenhagen criteria (1993) for the EU’s enlargement contains three major 
points: first, an applicant country must have a competitive market economy; second, 
it must be able to apply EU law, ie. EU acquis communautaire', and third, it must 
have a democratic system of government and have respect for human rights. It is in 
the political conditions of the Copenhagen criteria where serious problems for 
Turkish membership arose. For the EU, Turkey still lags behind the European 
standards. There are three main problems; first, the Turkish political structure has 
certain institutions such as the DGMs (State Security Courts) and the National 
Security Council which integrate the military into civilian politics, and this could be a 
definite problem in any democracy; second, there are serious problems with respect 
to human rights, especially in terms of detention and arbitrary use of custody and the 
wide spread use of torture while in custody; third, the Kurdish issue presents itself as 
an ongoing crisis for Turkish democracy. It is the inteiplay of these three factors that 
makes Turkish membership in the EU unlikely.
3.3. The Post-1980 Mililtary Takeover Period
The aim of the 1980 coup was to change the political arena as society was 
undoubtedly highly politicized. The coup was thought to be necessary to preserve the
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integrity of the country. The National Security Council, (NSC), an institution formed 
by the highest ranking officials of the military and government, announced that “the 
new government would be liberal, democratic, secular, based on the rule of law, and 
would respect human rights and freedoms” (Dağı, 1996: 124). After the military 
takeover the parliament and government were dissolved, leaders of parties were 
placed in custody, martial law was extended to the whole country, the press was 
monitored, the NSC took legislative power, and the period of detention without trial 
was extended to 90 days (Dağı, 1996; 124).
“Between September 1980 and February 1983 over 60,000 people suspected 
of terrorism and illegal political activities were arrested” (Dağı. 1996: 125). The right 
to lockout and strike were declared illegal, freedom of the press was abolished and 
the imprisonment of journalists and the banning of newspapers took place. The 
European Community condemned Turkey for destroying the democratic system and 
violating human rights. In 1981 the dissolution of political parties and the arrest of 
Bülent Ecevit the leader of the RPP were condemned by the European Union. Funds 
for Turkey as stated in the 4'*’ Financial Protocol were abolished. The Community felt 
justified in interfering in the domestic issues of Turkey since she had an association 
agreement with the Community itself. In the Fourth Financial Protocol it is stated that 
600 million ECU would be given as aid to Turkey to promote her economic and 
social development (Bulletin of European Communities, 1981: 60). But the banning
of political parties paved the way for a reaction in the European Community. On 10
April 1981. the European Parliam ent dec ided  on the su sp en s io n  o f  the E E C -T urkey  
Association agreement unless democratic institutions were restored within two
months (Dodd, 1983; 55). As a result General Evren set elections to signal a return to
6.5
democracy in 1983, and the Committee noted that observers would be sent to 
monitor the elections.
At the end of 1981 the Council of Europe reported that Turkey had not made 
progress toward the re-establishment of democracy, that torture and mass trials were 
still taking place, and that the defendants, generally trade union members, were being 
subjected to the death penalty. While preparing the new Constitution, Turkey was 
warned to be respectful of the European Convention on Human Rights. A year after 
the coup, the NSC reduced the detention period without trial to 45 days under 
European pressure. The Council of Europe was pressing for the reduction of the 
minimum period which had to be served before an appeal could be lodged in high 
court (Dağı, 1996: 138). Through the pressure from the Council, this period was 
limited to six months. All these events in Turkey soured its relations with the 
European Union. In 1982, the Assembly of the Council of Europe recommended that 
Turkish prisons be inspected by the International Red Cross. The Council of 
Europe called for an inquiry into human rights violations. And in 1982, Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and France raised the issue of human rights 
violations in Turkey. This case was brought before the Human Rights Commission in 
Strasbourg (Dodd, 1983: 55). In addition, the Assembly passed a resolution 
supporting the rights of ethnic minorities such as the Kurds.
Furthermore, the Committee wanted to find a solution to the Cyprus 
problem and the Kurdish issue. Hence Turkey was criticized in the European 
arliament and funds for Turkey were frozen. Mr. Leo Tindemans prepared a 
report about Turkey where he mentioned that there was a need for a return to 
democracy and that politicians under arrest had to be released and martial law 
had to end. The Council then adopted a policy of wait and see ( Dodd, 1983:
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57). Thus the EC reaction to the Turkish military takeover signalled the deteriotation
of relations with Turkey, and any future progress was delayed. An example of just
how antagonistic relations had become is illustrated by the following;
On 7 July 1982, Mr. Thron criticized the prison sentence passed 
by the Turkish Government on the former Prime Minister, Mr. 
Bülent Ecevit.The Commission had earlier criticized a previous 
sentence on Mr. Ecevit in November 1981. Mr. Thom stated 
that the sentence was a set back to efforts to restore a pluralist 
parliamentary democracy to which the Commission attached 
fundamental importance in its relations with Turkey, as it had 
made clear ever since the present Turkish authorities had come 
to power (Bulletin of European Communites, 1982: 62).
In some ways the 1982 Constitution could be accepted as a limited
democratic document. However, the 1983 elections came about in an undemocratic 
way since some of the political parties were still banned. Fundamental freedoms such 
as the freedom of expression were restricted. For example, there were laws stating 
that the media could not expose youth to harmful influences or news could not be 
expressed which would affect the security of the state such as reporting crime or 
rebellion. Thus in Article 14 of the Constitution, it is stated that none of the rights 
and liberties set forth by the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating 
the indivisible integrity of the state... (Dodd, 1983: 97). Also restrictions were put on 
political parties so that none of them could be tied to labour unions, youth 
organizations, or civil servants, and school and university teachers could not be party 
members. Labour unions were not allowed to engage in political activity, or to accept 
support from a party. The Supreme Arbitration Board would deal with lockouts and 
strikes.
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When the 1983 elections were held, the Motherland Pany headed by Turgut 
Özal won. It was a major step for the parties which were established by military 
support. Still, many view the 1983 elections as undemocratic because they were held 
under the control of the military. In 1987, a referendum was held to lift the ban on 
political leaders active before the 1980 coup, because the ban on political leaders was 
seen as a violation of freedom of expression. Following the referendum on April 
14,1987, when Turkey applied for full membership in the EC, the Commission’s 
opinion was that Turkey had not been fully democratized. It was believed that though 
there were positive developments regarding human rights, respect for the identity of 
minorities was not up to the level of other European democracies.
In order to deal with the EU criticisms, Turkey ratified the UN and Council of 
Europe Conventions for the prevention of torture and inhumane treatment (Dodd, 
1987). Turkey had to allow inspection of places where people’s liberty was 
considered under threat. In response to EC opinion Turkey began to reformulate its 
democratization and human rights policies. On 12 April 1991, the most criticized 
articles of the Turkish Penal Code concerning the banning of Marxist and religious 
propaganda and the use of religion for acquiring political power were abolished 
(Dodd, 1987). After the elections in the same year a democratization program was 
announced by Süleyman Demirel (leader of the True Path Party) and Erdal İnönü 
(leader of the Social Democratic Populist Party). The president’s powers were 
reformed. The presidency in the 1982 constitution was seen as a separate unit, 
contrary to the usual arrangements under parliamentary democracy. This was to be 
changed. The restrictions concerning the activities of labour unions were to be 
removed. Thus students and university teachers again would be allowed to join 
political parties; and women’s and youth branches of political parties were to be
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established. The press would be İTeer. In addition to these changes, a more 
proportional system was to be set up to increase the representation of smaller parties. 
In order to break the monopoly of the major parties, legal restriction on the free 
expression of ethnic groups in their own language were to be removed. Additionally 
police would be trained to respect human rights and police stations were to be opened 
to public scrunity. Despite the hopes associated with this democratization package, 
many of the structural problems in Turkish democracy remained.
In 1992, the government proposed some changes in the wording of the 
constitution regarding human rights. The Turkish President, Turgut Özal, signed the 
Charter of the CSCE when he was in power. In accordance with the provisions of the 
Charter, the Jail in Eskişehir was closed as a hunger strike was reaching its apex. The 
period of detention without a court appearance was reduced to twenty-four hours. If 
there are "mass” offences, it would extend to forty days (Dodd, 1987). In addition, 
the Social Democratic Populist Party prepared a proposal concerning labour rights 
but it was not accepted by the business sector and the True Path Party (TPP).
The Kurdish issue seriously damages the Turkish position on human rights. 
Many reforms can not be made due to the Kurdish separatist movement. In 1983, the 
military government established law no. 2932, which prohibited the use of any 
language other than first official language of Turkey (Dodd, 1987). The Kurdish issue 
was a problem in the Eastern border areas of Turkey during the beginning of the 
1980s and separatist terrorism began to rise from 1984 onwards. With the 
establishment of The Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkari Kurdistan)-PKK 
headed by Abdullah Öcalan, Kurdish separatism began to be a real threat to the 
Turkish Republic. In the 1980s, the PKK began to target civilians, including women 
and children and those who opposed the PKK. The PKK aimed to destroy Turkish
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authority in the southeast; in order to do so train stations, goveinmental buildings and 
warehouses were attacked. In order to cut the region’s connections with other parts of 
the country radio, television, telephone, and school systems were damaged. In 
addition, teachers were kidnapped in order to cut cultural ties between West and East. 
The attacks spread from the eastern boundaries to the metropolitan areas. Ships, 
buses, and crowded places were bombed, increasing tension between the Turks and 
the Kurds.
All these attacks were aimed at establishing the formation of an independent 
Kurdish state in what is currently Turkish territory. The Turkish Republic 
disapproved to this idea as it violated its territorial integrity. Yet some Western states 
were giving support to the idea of recognition of a Kurdish state and certain 
European powers were supporting Kurdish autonomy openly and Kurdish 
independence clandestinely. The Kurdish issue became a source of conflict between 
Turkey and the European states.
Although Turkish authorities did not recognize a state of civil war in the 
southern part of Turkey, the crisis in that region is more than simply isolated clashes 
between two opposing groups. The Turkish army found itself in a guerrilla war, 
which is hard for a conventional army to fight. It is very difficult to make a 
distinction between ordinary people and guerrillas. To suppress guerrilla activity, 
military policies such as the village-guard system were instituted the mid 1980s. In 
addition a state of emergency was declared in ten provinces in the southeast (1987) 
and an Anti-teiTor law was enacted (1991). The Village Guard was an organization 
established to create a civilian militia to fight against the PKK but this increased 
hostility between the local tribes. People were tom between joining the guard system
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or the PKK so the Kurdish people were caught between the two camps. There are 
currently more than 70,000 village guards who are paid by the Turkish State.
Under Emergency Law, civil rights and liberties can be suspended and the 
publishing of any material which reflects events in a distorted manner can be banned. 
Article 8 of the Anti-terror Law stated that “...written and oral propaganda and 
assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at damaging the indivisible unity of 
the state of Turkey with its territory and nation are forbidden regardless of method 
and ideas behind them’XKihp, 1998). State Security Courts dealt with cases of 
political or terrorist offences. Many people were imprisoned due to Article 8.
Especially after the 1980s violence in the region rose day by day. Torture, ill 
treatment, and disappearances were becoming a part of daily life, and the distinction 
between ordinary Kurds and the PKK was becoming increasingly difficult for 
security forces. Human rights abuses were still occurring. In order to prevent 
disappearances under police custody the detention period was reduced to forty days. 
A State Ministry of Human Rights and a Parliamentary Human Rights Commission 
were established. Human rights education was deemed mandatory to make people 
aware of their rights. At issue is really the preservation of the indivisibility of the 
state versus the human rights of people.
The US Helsinki Watch Committee prepared a report on Turkey concerning 
human rights violations, which was published in 1983. It contains the following;
• Rights of individuals in Turkey were violated. People were detained under 
difficult conditions and torture was used. The rights of the Kurdish-speaking 
minority were suppressed.
• Under martial law, prisoners were allowed to be held for 45 days without seeing 
their families or lawyers. Prison conditions were unbearable and torture was used
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against prisoners. Though torture is outlawed in the Turkish Penal Code and the 
1982 Constitution, Turkey is accused of using torture both in police stations and 
in military prisons.
• Freedom of expression is guaranteed in the of Constitution but many Turkish 
writers were arrested due to their work and censorship was practiced. For 
example, Nazim Hikmet through Pictures, a book written by Müjdat Gezen, was 
banned.
• Şerafettin Elçi who was a cabinet minister during the 1970s was sentenced to 
prison because of his speech '‘I am a Kurd. There are Kurds in Turkey”. Law 
prohibits publication in the Kurdish language, which is contrary to the concept of 
freedom of expression.
• When the Turkish military seized control in 1980, independent institutions such 
as political parties, trade unions, and universities were restricted (A Report from 
Helsinki Watch, 1983: 9). It was recommended that the US Embassy appoint a 
specific human rights officer who would work to seek information about human 
rights in Turkey and prepare a report for the US State Department. International 
human rights organizations were to visit Turkish officials. US human rights 
organizations would monitor the human rights situation in Turkey and report on 
it. They would also work with international human rights organizations to 
monitor human right abuses. After 12 years, in 1995 Amnesty International 
reported that there were still human rights violations occurring in Turkey 
(Amnesty International USA, 1995: 1).
Amnesty International prepared some recommendations for the prevention of ill 
treatment, extrajudicial execution, and disappearances practiced in southeast against 
the Kurds. Among their recommendations when an operation is launched, reports
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must be prepared listing the officers participated in the operation, and the names of 
the detained must be noted. Village guards must bring prisoners to a judicial 
authority without punishing the prisoners themselves.
On the point of torture and disappearance, all detainees must be allowed to see 
lawyers. The date, time and duration of the interrogation period must be recorded and 
these must be open to judicial examination and to the inspection of detainees and 
lawyers (Amnesty International USA, 1995: 26).
So to prevent the risk of torture. Amnesty International wanted the government to 
amend the law so that detainees must be brought before the Court within 24 hours, 
and that a commission of investigation should be established in line with the United 
Niitions Principles for the prevention of extra-legal, arbitrary executions. 
Additionally, they proposed that “Article 8 of the Anti-temor Law, that provides long 
terms of imprisonment for any separatist propaganda, imespective of whether the 
writings or speeches in question contain any advocacy of violence, should be 
repealed or amended” (Amnesty International USA, 1995; 1).
Thus, although Turkey is considered a democratic state, its violations of human 
rights are the main issue especially criticized in the international arena. The 1961 
Constitution was the most liberal constitution in Turkish history, but excessive 
freedom of the people was thought to have caused the polarization of society and so 
in the 1982 Constitution freedom was restricted. In this chapter, I focused on how the 
human rights concept developed in Turkey and how Turkey was perceived by 
international organizations. At the very beginning of a new century Turkey is still on 
the black list regarding human rights. The 1983 Helsinki Report and the 1995 Report 
of Amnesty International showed Turkey’s image has not changed in the minds of 
Westerners. These reports were published by organizations regarded (at least in
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Turkey) as sympathetic to the Kurds, and the Turkish State was seen violating the 
rights oF minorities while the struggle for the preservation of the integrity of the 
Turkish state was not accepted as sufficient justification for such behaviour. 
Certainly it is accurate that the 1982 Constitution is not a truly democratic 
Constitution, as the human rights of people are violated on some issues like freedom 
of thought, opinion, and expression, and journalists and other writers are sent to 
prison due to the expression of their thoughts.
But on the Kurdish issue, Turkey feels that it is being treated unfairly since the 
Kurd's violence against civilians is not taken into account. Thus the Turkish 
Government would be well advised to prepare reports like international organizations 
do to justify the struggle in the southeast. Recent developments regarding the 
Kurdish issue revived interest in the human rights issue for member states of the EU, 
especially Italy. After the capture of Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan, the EU 
resumed monitoring Turkey more closely.
There have been separatist terrorist actions in the southeastern pan of Anatolia 
since the beginning of 1980s. Abdullah Ocalan has been accused of causing the death 
of 35,000 people and he has been put in to prison due to “instigating separatist 
activities of Turkey” (Article 125 of Turkish Penal Code) for which he has been 
sentenced to death (Baydar, 1999: 20).
The judiciary system in Turkey is formally independent but the system has been
criticized in the case of alleged offences. Anti-terrorist law states that
All sort of actions to be attempted by a person ... for the purpose of 
changing attributes of the Republic... destroying the indivisible 
integrity of the state, its territory and nation, endangering the 
existence of the Turkish State and Republic, undermining or
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destroying or seizing the authority of the State....(is prohibited)
(Turkey's Progress Report, 1998).
The Öcalan case became a testground for the Turkish judiciary, especially regarding 
the status of the State Security Courts (SSC). The State Security Courts, Devler 
Güvenlik Mahkemeleri (DGM), were established under the 1982 Constitution. The 
European Commission on Rights criticized Turkey on the slowness of trials, the 
period of custody for the defendants, and having judges with military ties. Military 
judges must not be allowed to try civilians and Turkey is the only example in Europe 
of this occurring.
So to eliminate these concerns, the prosecutor of the SSC, Talat Şahin, 
stressed that the Öcalan trial would be fair, the accused would be granted the right to 
defend himself, and he would have the right to have his own lawyers so everything 
would be consistent with the law (Baydar, 1999: 20).
The importance of the Öcalan case is that it has become an indicator of the 
Turkish adjustment to EU standard and to democracy. On the other hand, it has 
negatively impacted Turkey’s relations with some EU members. For example, Italy 
criticised Turkey on the human rights issue. On 6-7 July, 1999 the Italian parliament 
held a general session where the Kurdish issue was discussed. In the parliament these 
decisions were taken;
• Italy would try every thing possible in order to block the death 
penalty.
• The Kurdish issue must be solved peacefully and Turkey must take into 
consideration the concerns of the Kurds about autonomous status.
• The D’Alema government would play the role of balancer 
between the EU and Turkey to accelerate accession.
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• The selling of military technology and weapons to Turkey would 
be limited.
• Under the UN Security Council, an International Kurdish 
Conference should be held (Cerrahoglu, 1999; 20).
At the same time, the Italian government pressed Turkey to send Abdullah Ocalan 
back to Italy.
Ocalan admitted that he was guilty but he insisted that he would help the 
Turkish authorities if the Turkish judiciary would let him live. He also added that he 
would serve the Turkish State. The PKK has groups in Central and Eastern Europe, 
so he said that the PKK could be used by Turkey to balance relations with these 
countries in the future.
After the big tiial the Turkish judiciary agreed on the death penalty for 
Abdullah Ocalan. This decision revived the human rights issue and member states of 
the EU began to address the Ocalan case. They all disagree with the death penalty for 
the leader of the PKK since it is believed that if he is executed then terror will 
increase in the region even more. Also, it is clear that if this decision were carried out 
the EU would probably accuse Turkey of human rights abuses again. The Ocalan 
case is a test of Turkey’s compatibility with EU standards. It was for this reason that 
the Turkish government has become very sensitive on this issue. Because the Kurdish 
problem is used as a barometer for Turkey’s adjustment to EU standards, the 
common perception in the EU, as illustrated by the Italian reactions, is that Turkey 
has failed in adhering to these standards.
Thus serious problems exist in Turkey's behaviour regarding human rights. In 
the 1990s, Turkey’s human rights violations have opened a gap between Turkey and 
the European Union.
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CHAPTER IV
ATTITUDES OF TURKISH ELITE TO EU POLICIES
This chapter analyzes the attitudes of the Turkish elite to the European Union. In 
order to learn their attitudes, a survey was conducted with bureaucrats, businessmen, 
academicians, and journalists. The results reveal both sharp distinctions as well as 
similarities between the academic group and the rest of the respondents. Please see the 
Appendix for the questions used in the survey.
The analysis of the respondents’ answers highlights a brief discussion concerning 
Turkey’s integration into the EU. Questions in the survey are designed to reveal Turkish 
elite attitudes towards the democratic, social, and economic ways of life in Turkey as 
opposed to how the EU perceives them.
In one respect, the academician’s answers can be thought of as the most 
important part of the survey since they are the most educated class in the society. So, this 
group’s views should be most objective regarding the problems that Turkey is facing in 
regard to European Union admission. Thus, in order to analyze the level of knowledge 
of the various groups, I will compare the rest of the respondents’ answers with the 
academicians’. However, in some questions related to economics, I will look at the 
responses of businessmen as well as academicians versus the rest.
Before beginning the comparative analysis, I would like to comment on the general 
results of the questionnaire. First I will look at to the responses to the questions classified
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regarding whether the subject concerns economics, democratization/human rights, or 
Turkey’s place in the future of Europe.
4.1. Analysis of the Answers of the Respondents
At the beginning of the survey, it is asked whether the respondents think that 
Turkey is likely be admitted to EU within the next 10 years. The result is slightly over 
half answered very or somewhat likely.
Table 1.
How likely it is that Turkey will be admitted to the EU as a full member within 
the next 10 years?
Value Label Percent (%)
Very Likely 11.9
Somewhat Likely 39.5
Somewhat Unlikely 16.0
Very Unlikely 28.2
Don’t Know 2.7
Total 98.3
Valid cases 96
(Total does not equal 100 due to missing cases)
This shows that the respondents are divided regarding the possibility of 
Turkey’s being admitted to the European Union.
The next two questions are about Turkey's not being admitted to the European 
Union and how to solve this problem.
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Table 2.
What do you think is the primary reason Turkey has not been admitted to the 
EU as a full member?
Value Label Percent (%)
Demography/Population 12.3
Free circulation 5.6
Economic problems 30.0
Political problems 3.8
Human rights 5.8
Religion 17.5
Ethnic identity 10.0
Opposition of Greece 2.5
Timing 3.3
Social Structural Problems 4.4
Other 4.8
Total 100
Valid cases 96
Table 3.
What can be done to solve this particular problem?
Value Label Percent(%)
Economic Stability 29.7
Political Stability 7.1
Democratization 7.0
Promote itself 8.5
Nothing can be done 22.9
Social development 5.6
Avoid nationalism 1.0
Other 17.1
No answer 1.0
Total 99.9
Valid cases 96
The largest number of the respondents believe that Turkey has not been 
admitted because of economic problems. 30% of the respondents answer in that 
manner and a similar percentage believe that the solution of this problem is to
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establish economic stability (29.7% of the respondents), again the largest percentage 
of these respondents.
Nearly half of the respondents think that Turkey is somewhat likely be 
admitted to European Union within 10 years. Furthermore a plurality of the 
respondents believe that the primary reason for Turkey’s not being admitted is related 
to economic problems and think that economic stability is needed to overcome not 
being accepted into the European Union. Thus the main problem as well as regarding 
Turkey’s failure to achieve membership in the EU is seen as being primarily 
economic.
Taking a look at the results of academicians, one seeds that 41.7% think that 
Turkey is somewhat likely be admitted to European Union within ten years. Their 
answers are in this respect similar to those of the general population but regarding the 
primary reason for not being admitted academics are more likely to believe this is 
related to demography/population (29.2%), rather than tending to feel the primary 
reason is economic problems. However, when asked other reasons for Turkey’s not 
being admitted, 22.7% cite economic problems too. In this regard it could be said that 
academicians are in agreement with the general results (Tables not displayed).
As a result, one sees that academicians think population is the main problem 
for not being accepted in the EU, and economic problems can be stated as secondaiy 
for them, as opposed to rest of the respondents. Generally, regarding the solutions for 
overcoming the problems for full membership, they state that Turkey must not view 
her future only in terms of European Union membership, and she must not only aim 
to become a member of the EU since she must address her problems in any event.
Further questions also pointed to the importance of economic development in 
the minds of respondents.
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What would be the best thing about Turkey being admitted to the European Union?
Table 4.
Value Label Percent (%)
Economic Development 47.2
Social Development 3.3
Democratization / human rights 14.5
European credentials 19.4
Legal System /reorganization 3.1
Technological improvement 1.0
No benefit 4.6
Other 4.6
No answer 2.3
Total 100
Valid cases 96
These results show that, when respondents are asked about what would be the 
best thing about being admitted to the European Union, a large plurality said that 
economic development would be the best result. If it is asked would there be any 
other positive things about Turkey’s being admitted to EU, an additional 38.7% of the 
total respondents answer that economic development will be another positive thing 
for Turkey’s accession. As a result, the best reason and the other reasons for accession 
are both related to economic reasons. This shows that the EU is accepted as an 
economic entity hence it is not an only economic entity.
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What would be the best thing about Turkey being admitted to the European
Table 5. (Academicians)
Union?
Value Label Percent (%)
Economic Development 45.8
Social Development 4.2
Democratization / human rights 8.3
European credentials 8.3
Legal System /reorganization 12.5
Technological improvement 4.2
No benefit 8.3
Other 8.3
Total 99.9
Valid cases 24 Missing cases 0
Table 6. (Academicians)
Would there be any other positive things for Turkey?
Value Label Percent (%)
Economic Development 20.8
Social Development 8.3
Democratization / human rights 20.8
European credentials 8.3
Legal System /reorganization 4.2
Other 12.5
No answer 20.8
Total 95.7
Missing cases 1Valid cases 23 
(Total does not equal 100 due to missing cases)
These results above are for the academicians. As we see, 45.8% believe that 
being admitted to the EU will bring economic development, a result similar to the 
general respondents. However, a significantly higher percentage answer that 
democratization/human rights is another good thing that would result from Turkey’s
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being admitted to the EU. Academicians could be thought to have a deeper 
understanding of the legal framework necessary for membership, but like the others, 
they generally answer in terms of economic improvement. The results from the 
academicians answers are interesting since the Copenhagen criteria state that member 
states must have a stable democracy with rule of law, have a competitive market 
economy to cope with a single market, and also have the ability to cope with the 
obligations set up by Community Law. In this respect, the “no answer” ratio is 
surprising since one would think that academicians do have answers to these kinds of 
open-ended questions. Academicians generally give popular answers, one would 
expect for example that the ratio of “reorganization of legal system” would be higher 
than the ratio of no answers.
The above analysis refers only the open-ended questions. When the results of 
the scaled and close-ended ones are analyzed, the results generally show that the 
academicians and the rest of the respondents feel very similarly. 47.2% of the total 
respondents strongly agree that full membership to the EU will bring economic 
benefits. Among the academicians, 45.8% think like that too (See tables 4 and 6).
Regarding the role of economics, both general and academic respondents gave 
similar answers more or less. Respondents were most likely to says Turkey has not 
been accepted into the EU due to “economic reasons” and also that the solution to 
being accepted is related with “economic stability” in Turkey. Then, when asked what 
is the worst thing that would result from Turkey being admitted, 29.2% of the 
academicians think that membership will bring economic harm to Turkey. Also 
regarding the question about whether full membership would bring economic 
benefits, 45.8% strongly agree, 33.3% agree, 8.3% are undecided and 12.5% disagree. 
So, this highlights a considerable disagreement among academicians as to the possible
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economic effects of EU membership (see table 7). I changed the 3'^ '^ value (economic 
harm) of V12 to the name ecoharm and try to analyze the two questions for 
academicians, for the general respondents, and for a different group who are linked 
with economic relations-businessmen.
Table 7.
Full membership in the EU will bring Turkey economic benefits (by ECOHARM)
ECOHARM
1
strongly
agree
undecided
disagree
No economic Hann Economic Harm
7 4
63.6 36.4
41.2 57.1
29.2 16.7
7 1
87.5 12.5
41.2 14.3
29.2 4.2
1 1
50.0 50.0
5.9 14.3
4.2 4.2
2 1
66.7 33.3
11.8 14.3
8.3 4.2
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For Academicians, 36.4% answer that they strongly agree that membership to 
EU will bring economic benefits also, said that the worst thing about being admitted 
to the EU is “economic harm”. 57.1% of the ones who answer that membership in the 
EU will bring “economic haiTn”, also that they strongly agree that membership in the 
EU will bring economic benefits.
Table 8.
Full membership in the EU will bring Turkey economic benefit (by 
ECOHARM)
ECOHARM
1
Strongly agree
No economic 
harm
Economic harm
35 10
76.9 23.1
46.4 49.1
36.2 10.8
For the general ratio of the respondents, 23.1% strongly agree that 
membership to EU will bring economic harm. 49.1% of the ones, who cited economic 
harms, strongly agree that membership will also bring economic benefits.
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Full membership in the EU will bring Turkey economic benefit
(By ECOHARM)
ECOHARM
Table 9.
No economic 
harm
Economic harm
1
7 5
Strongly agree 60.0 40.0
42.9 66.7
30.0 20.0
9
7 2
Agree 75.0 25.0
42.9 33.3
30.0 10.0
3
2
Undecided 100.0
14.3
10.0
40.0% of the businessmen strongly agrees that membership will bring 
economic harms. 66.7% of the ones, who respond with economic harm, strongly 
agree that the membership to EU will also bring economic benefits.
The respondents answers are generally consistent with the answers they give 
for the questions related with human rights in Turkey. Questions 24 and 25 in the 
survey are (V24) The Turkish human rights policy must be changed before Turkey 
will be admitted into the EU; (V20) The death penalty must be abolished in Turkey 
before it will be accepted as a full member of the EU.
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Academicians strongly believe both that the death penalty must be abolished 
and Turkey must change her human rights policy before being admitted to the EU. 
There is a strong positive con-elation, which is almost perfect (R = .95). The results of 
the all respondents are not as strong as the academicians although there is a positive 
correlation between the answers. (R= .65).
The result for businessmen shows that there is not a strong correlation 
between these proposals (R= .17). Apparently they do not associate abolishing of the 
death penalty with human rights policies. As a result, I can say that when abolishing 
the death penalty is considered, most of the academicians see it within the scope of 
human rights but large parts of the rest of the elite society, especially the business 
community may not regard the death penalty as a legitimate violation of human rights, 
a view that conflicts with the EU perspective sharply.
Finally, I would like to mention a situation, which could be an obstacle for 
Turkey’s place in the EU in the future. Today human rights and democracy are the 
most valid concerns of the EU but if Turkey solves these problems then other 
concerns could be voiced. If EU is seen as a “Christian Club” then Turkey’s being a 
Muslim country could be seen as a future obstacle. The 18'*’ and 35'*’ questions of the 
survey are stated as: (VI8) Turkey’s being a Muslim country has prevented it from 
becoming a full member of the EU; (V35) The fact that Turkey is a predominantly 
Islamic country is a valid reason for Turkey not to be accepted as a full EU member.
The results that I analyze above show that academicians generally respond in 
the same manner as the rest of the respondents. Now, I would like to look at the 
results for another group-businessmen. Academicians are not directly involved in 
economic relations as businessmen are. Thus, I try to find the similarities, differences 
and contradictions between the responses of businessmen and academicians. It is
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impossible to analyze for all the questions within the context of this thesis, that’s why 
I concentrate on three grounds; economics, human rights and Turkey’s place in the 
future Europe. The respondents put most of the blame on economics when asked for 
the primary reason for not being admitted to the EU, even though the EU has relations 
with ex-communist states for accession despite their problems with economic stability 
and democracy.
4.2. Turkish Elite Attitudes and Integration Theories
I do not have an exact hypothesis about Turkish elite attitudes since Turkey 
does not have a stable economic life. Turkey is not trusted in the eyes of Europeans, 
especially on the human rights issue. Turkey must have a strong, rational domestic 
and international policy against Europe in order to battle against the obstacles for its 
being a partner of the EU.
While I was doing this survey, especially some academicians insisted on the 
formulation of scaled statement questions. They send that these questions (V18-V35) 
are organized in a manner that Turkey must do this or must not do that to achieve 
membership in the EU. I tried to explain that these questions are statements which are 
made by the EU regarding the obstacles to Turkey’s non acceptance such as the 
Kurdish issue, human rights, economic instability, being a Muslim country...etc. 
Although, I explained that these are not our thoughts they felt uncomfortable while 
answering a question which asks about abolishing the death penalty. They said that 
they believe that it must be abolished but not for the sake of Europe. Then he/she 
marked undecided. So, these kinds of responses affected our results.
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Finally, academicians sometimes do not give the answers that are expected; 
they offer to give no answer or answer different than the question. Academicians give 
very popular answers.
Basically this survey research demonstrated that human rights violations are 
perceived as an obstacle to Turkey’s integration into the EU by only a small portion of 
the elite in Turkey. What is interesting is that this is also one of the valid obstacles 
from the European point of view.
To tie the beginning of this thesis to what we have discovered throughout, the 
Turkish elite does not perceive the changes in the European order as important. What 
is happening in Europe, ie. the past Maastricht orders and harmonization of politics 
among EU members, is largely missed. The convergence of norms and values in 
Europe that causes so much importance to be attached to political conditions must be 
seriously taken into account.
In integration theories, transfer of sovereignty to a supranational organization 
is the main problem. The results of the survey show that 40.5% of the people agreed 
that, after being admitted as a full member to the EU, independent foreign policy in 
Turkey will be impossible. On the other hand 36.4% of the respondents disagree on 
the same issue. The ratios are pretty close to each other so that the expectation of 
transfer of sovereignty is not as strong as imposed in the integration theories in 
chapter I. This may indicate that the respondents may fail in understanding the nature 
of European integration and the path the EU is moving on which is coordinated policy 
making as implied by the Maastricht Treaty.
The most important result from the survey is that the EU is seen as an 
economic partnership rather than a political union. This could happen due to Turkey’s 
being a member of the customs union but on the other hand when social or political
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questions are put to the respondents, they focus on the problems of Turkey concerning
democracy and human rights that present the greatest obstacle to integration. 42.5% of
the respondents believe that human rights policy must be changed. The human rights
issue is generally understood as connected with democracy.
The respondents feel that membership in the EU will bring economic benefits
and harm at the same time but also that membership will increase living standards.
This could be a good example of the validity of the integration theories of
functionalism and neo-functionalism. Membership in the EU is seen as a means to
economic improvement so regarding this specific issue it is acceptable to be in a
supranational organization a position computable with functionalism. On the other
hand respondents believe that economic benefits will increase social standards which
means that an improvement in one area will have a spillover effect on another as
proposed in the theory of neo-functionalism.
At the intergovernmental conference on political union in Maastricht one of
the important issues was the future evolution of security and defence of the Union.
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the struggles in Yugoslavia proved that
international organizations were too slow at taking decisions in a crisis situation. This
provoked the idea of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to strengthen
the power of the existing institutions. The difference between the of CFSP and the
EPC is stated in Title V of the Treaty as:
Provided the legal basis upon which to upgrade EPC operations; 
bring the old EPC secretariat inside the Council of Ministers and 
gave it a larger and permanent staff and budget....with the foreign 
political activities of EPC.. to form more rounded and consistent EU 
policies; open up the possibility that some decisions may be reached 
by qualified majorities...It seemed as if the EU would be poised to
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adopt new kinds of higher profile foreign policy actions previously 
not thought possible. ( George, 1996: 273).
The EU is giving importance to high politics such as security but on the other 
hand Turkey views the EU only in economic terms which is a great mistake.
So in summary, people are aware of the obstacles for Turkey’s non-acceptance 
into the EU but at the same time respondents are somewhat likely to believe that 
Turkey will be admitted to the EU within a ten years period.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis to addresses the Turkish position in the EU with a focus on the 
issues of human rights and democracy. The main proposition is that the EU rejects 
Turkey’s pleas for membership due to Turkey’s bad record in human rights. Although 
there are many reasons for Turkey’s rejection as a full member to the EU, the EU 
generally insisted on the issues of human rights and democracy. Turkey made an 
official application for membership in 1987 but it was rejected. Turkey is regarded as 
a country that violates human rights and democratic government.
This thesis utilizes a model that integration into a supranational organization 
brings a clash between national and international interests. To apply the model, 
Turkey’s history with the EU was analyzed within a framework provided by 
integration theories. The ultimate aim of a nation state is to establish and maintain its 
sovereignty. Thus, all the integration theories fail at the same point: ceding of 
sovereignty. Neofunctionalism states the idea that states have to converge with each 
other on specific issues then an improvement in one area would have a spillover effect 
on another. In the 1970s in Turkey, two government institutions were on opposite 
sides for this reason. The State Planning Organization was undoubtedly against 
membership due to economic harm. On the other hand the Foreign Ministry supported 
membership due to political reasons.
Throughout the thesis I emphasize to the views of European Institutions but 
when the democratic life of Turkey is analyzed, military interventions are highlighted.
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Especially the 1983 elections were truly undemocratic in that many parties were 
banned and the NSC held power during the preparation of the 1982 Constitution. 
Basic freedoms were restricted, and that was undemocratic too.
Also since 1980 there has been a guerrilla war in the souteastem part of 
Anatolia with a separatist group, the PKK. Turkey has been criticized on its Kurdish- 
Turkish policy. Other countries prepared reports about Turkish action against the 
Kurds. Turkey was condemned for violating human rights in that region. Turkey was 
also condemned in 1996 due to the violation of Article 3 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights which abolishes capital punishment. Capital punishment is also 
used in the United States of America, a state in which human rights are said to be 
implemented at the most appropriate level. It is said that if the death penalty against 
Abdullah Ocalan is carried out then Turkey’s accession to the EU will be more 
difficult.
Turkey does not recognize Kurds as an ethnic minority. The Kurdish people 
and the terrorist activity of the PKK must be separated from each other. But it is 
obvious that the southeastern part of Turkey is in a disadvantageous position as 
compared to the West. The living standards of the people are very low, and education 
is inadequate in the region. So people feel that they are treated in a discriminatory 
manner and they take part in separatist activities. The Turkish government must work 
on projects for the southeast to bring peace and stability to the region. Some special 
laws will be implemented for terrorists who voluntarily give up separatist activities. 
Turkey has not been able to promote the southeast part of its territory; in uprisings 
since the 1980s many people have been killed and are still being killed everyday.
In the third ciiapter of the thesis, I propose that the state of democracy in 
Turkey is far from EU standards. There are concerns about Turkey with respect to
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human rights, implementation of democracy and recognition of minority rights, which 
are reasons for the European Union’s negative attitudes to Turkey’s membership. In 
the thesis, I analyze EU reservations about Turkey and try to look at the situation from 
the EU perspective.
The Copenhagen Criteria of the European Council stated that a member 
country should have a democratic type of government, rule of law, and an existing 
free market economy. Turkey has passed one obstacle in that it proved that it has a 
functioning free market economy when it formed a customs union with the EU. But 
the remaining political criteria seemed to be harder to achieve. The stmctural 
problems in Turkish democracy are the main objections from the EU. Turkey has 
been adopting a democratization program since the 1980s to get closer to the EU 
principles.
The negotiations between the EU and Central/Eastem European countries 
began in 1998. The EU gave its full support to the ex-communist states to restore 
democracy. On the other hand, Turkey is always condemned for human rights abuses 
and democracy. However, in the Cologne meeting of June 1999, it is stated that 
NATO member countries will be subject to different treatment regarding EU 
accession. But the dispute between Turkey and Greece has not been solved due to the 
Cyprus issue. If Turkey does not act fast as to be in accordance with EU acquis then 
as time passes it will be hard to bargain with the EU.
Throughout the thesis I emphasize Europeans views but in the final chapter I 
propose that Turkish attitudes to the EU are different than EU attitudes. What one 
notices is that there seems to be little awareness in Turkey as to what the EU stands 
for and what kind of an entity is emerging. In this manner, I can claim that Turkish
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attitudes reveal that the EU is seen only as an economic organization not as a 
challenge to state sovereignty.
In sum, Turkey thinks of the EU in economic terms but the EU is working on 
political integration. A Common Foreign and Security Policy has been formed. Also 
the strength of institutions like the European Parliament have been increased. Besides 
this, the EURO has been introduced as the currency of most of the EU member states. 
But most important is the aim of creating ‘Union Citizenship’ which meant that the 
rights of the citizens of the member states will move freely over borders like capital, 
services, goods and people. While the EU is moving forward, Turkey is still waiting 
at the beginning point after years. Human rights and democracy are the main obstacles 
for rejection but the EU policy towards ex-communist states is difficult to understand 
since these countries have not been protective of these concepts. The EU maintains 
the policy that membership would help these countries to restore democracy. If the 
EU truly wanted Turkey as a full member then it would employ the same policy 
toward Turkey. So it may be very hard for Turkey to become part of Europe in the 
future.
NB:
While this thesis was in preparation, Turkey was accepted in the group of 
candidate countries for EU membership at the Helsinki meeting in December 1999. 
This marks a historic change in the relationship between Turkey and the EU. 
Nevertheless, the issues that have hindered Turkey's serious consideration for 
membership in the Union and which have been highlighted in this thesis, that is, 
democracy and human rights, remain unresolved. Therefore, it is clear that the thesis
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put forward in this work continues to be a valid interpretation of Turkish-EU 
relations.
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APPENDIX
Elite Survey on the European Union
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: I am a Master’s-level student at Bilkent University, 
and I am working with an assistant professor in the department of politics and public 
admin to administer surveys to people thought to be somewhat knowledgeable about 
the European Union. This survey is part of a class project, but the results are likely to 
be published in an academic journal and to help gain funding for future surveys on 
this same topic. We have some general questions about your work, education level, 
etc., and also some questions specifically about your opinions regarding Turkey’s 
relations with the EU. Please be assured that your answers are absolutely 
confidential and that your name will not be revealed to anyone in the future.
Let’s begin with questions about your work.
1. Elite category (to be filled in before the interview):
[] Journalist 
[] Academic 
[] Business person 
[] Government ministry
2. ACADEMICS ONLY: In which department do you work (this can also be filled 
in before the interview)?
[] International relations 
[] Political Science 
[] Economics 
[] Management 
[] Other________________
lOI
3. TO BUREAUCRATS ONLY: Can you briefly describe the responsibilities of 
your position?
4. TO ACADEMICS ONLY: Did you ever or do you now have an academic interest 
in issues concerning the European Union?
[] Yes 
[] No
[] Other_____________
a. IF YES, please elaborate.
5. TO JOURNALISTS ONLY: Did you ever or do you now have a journalistic 
interest in issues concerning the European Union?
[] Yes 
[] No
[] Other_____________
a. If YES, please elaborate.
6. TO BUSINESSPERSONS ONLY: Did you ever or do you now have business 
affairs that could somehow be linked with the European Union?
[] Yes 
[] No
[] Other_____________
a. If YES, please elaborate.
Now, we’d like to know a little bit about your views on Turkey’s relations with the 
European Union.
7. Could you tell me how likely it is that Turkey will be admitted to the European 
Union as a full member within the next 10 years? Is it:
[] Very likely 
[] Somewhat likely 
[J Somewhat unlikely 
[] Very unlikely 
[] Don’t know
8. What do you think is the primary reason Turkey has not been admitted to the 
European Union as a full member?
a. What can be done to solve this particular problem?
9. Are there any other important reasons that Turkey has not been admitted?
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a. And, what can be done to solve these problems?
10. Which cuirent European Union member states do you think are against Turkey’s 
full membership in the EU? Why are each of these states is against Turkey’s full 
membership.
AT (name of country).
A2. (reason for that country being against Turkey’s membership)
B1. (name of country).
B2. (reason for that country being against Turkey’s membership)
11. What would be the best thing about Turkey being admitted to the European 
Union?
a. Would there be any other positive things about Turkey being admitted?
12. And what would be the worst thing about Turkey being admitted to the European 
Union?
a. Would there be any other negative things about Turkey being admitted?
13. Is EU membership vital for Turkey?
[] Yes 
[] No 
[] Other,
a. If YES, in what ways?
14. Which groups in Turkish society do you perceive as being opposed to Turkey’s 
joining the EU as a full member?
a. Why are these groups opposed to Turkey’s membership in the EU?
15. Which political party do you expect would make it easier for Turkey to be 
admitted into the EU as a full member?
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16. Are you in favor or opposed to Turkey eventually joining the European Union as 
a full member? Would you say you are:
[] Strongly in favor 
[] In favor 
[] Opposed 
[J Strongly opposed 
[] Don’t know
17. Is it possible for Turkey to take part in any union other than the EU?
[] Yes 
[] No
[] Other___________
a. If YES, which other union(s) could Turkey be in?
b. If NO, why can’t Turkey take part in any other union?
For the following statements, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, 
undecided, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Unclecide
d
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
NA
18. Turkey’s being a Muslim country 
has prevented it from becoming a 
full member of the European Union.
1 2 3 4 5 9
19. The political problems with 
Greece must be solved before 
Turkey is accepted as a full member 
of the EU
I 2 3 4 5 9
20. The death penalty must be 
abolished in Turkey before it will be 
accepted as a full member of the EU
1 2 3 4 5 9
21. The Kurdish issue must be 
settled before Turkey is accepted as 
a full member of the EU.
1 2 3 4 5 9
22. Turkey should be willing to 
change its domestic laws in order to 
become a full member of the EU.
I 2 3 4 5 9
23. Turkey should receive financial 
support from the member countries 
to meet the economic criteria set by 
the EU.
1 2 3 4 5 9
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24. The Turkish human rights policy 
must be changed before Turkey will 
be admitted into the EU.
1 2 3 4 5 9
25. Full membership in the European 
Union will bring Turkey economic 
benefits.
1 2 3 4 5 9
26. The standard of Turkish products 
will increase after Turkey becomes a 
full member of the EU.
1 2 3 4 5 9
27. Turkey will benefit from being 
able to have conflicts with other 
countries resolved within the EU.
1 2 3 4 5 9
28. Full membership in the EU will 
bring domestic political stability in 
Turkey.
1 2 3 4 5 9
29. Full membership in the EU will 
bring an increased standard of living 
for the average Turkish citizen.
1 2 3 4 5 9
30. EU membership will decrease 
the influence of Islam in Turkish 
politics.
1 2 3 4 5 9
31. EU membership will decrease 
the influence of extreme right-wing 
parties in Turkish politics.
1 2 3 4 5 9
32. Turkey will not be able to 
conduct an independent policy in 
international issues as a full EU 
member.
1 2 3 4 5 9
33. Small-scale business in Turkey 
will suffer if it becomes a full EU 
member.
1 2 3 4
1
5
l
9
34. Turkey’s leverage in the Middle 
East will increase if Turkey becomes 
a full EU member.
1 2 3 4 5 9
35. The fact that Turkey is a 
predominantly Islamic country is a 
valid reason for Turkey to not be 
accepted as a full EU member.
1 2 3 4 5 9
36. How can Turkey go about changing the perceptions in the EU regarding human
rights violations?
37. Since the amest of Abdulah Ocalan, the Turkish government has begun presenting 
evidence indicating that Greece has participated in supporting the terrorist activities
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of the PKK. Given that Greece is a member of the EU, if Greece has indeed helped 
the PKK, in what ways will this influence the relations between Turkey and the EU?
Finally, we would like to know your views on the future of the EU.
38. Would you say you agree or disagree that the Euro will strengthen the economy 
of the entire EU? Do you;
[] Strongly agree 
[] Agree 
[] Uncertain 
[] Disagree 
[] Strongly Disagree
39. The adoption of the Euro is likely to lead to further political integration of the EU 
member states. Do you;
[] Strongly agree 
[] Agree 
[] Uncertain 
[] Disagree 
[] Strongly Disagree
40. Do you anticipate that the EU will become an integrated political unit that has 
independent leverage in international affairs within the next 20 years?
[] Yes 
[] No
[] Other_______________
And now, we’d like to get some basic demographic information about you.
41. Gender
[] Female 
[] Male
42. Education; what is your highest degree?
[] No degree
[] Completed primary school
[] Completed secondary school
[] Completed high school
[J Received an associate (2-year) degree
[] Received undergraduate university degree
[] Received master’s degree
[] Received PhD
[] Other________________
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43. In which country did you receive your highest degree?
44. What is your monthly income (in TLs)?
[] 0-200,000,000 TLs 
[] 200,000,000-400,000,000 TLs 
[] 400,000,000-600,000,000 TLs 
[] 600,000,000-900,000,000 TLs 
[] 900,000,000 TLs and above 
[] Other________________
END OF INTERVIEW.
Questions for interviewer:
45. Who interviewed the respondent?
[] Neslihan 
[] Tijen 
[] Emre 
[] GLiniz 
[] Emrah
46. Date of interview (day.month);
47. Time of the start of the interview:
48. Length of the interview (in minutes):
49. Number of other people present during the interview;
50. Who was present during the interview (besides you and the respondent)? 
Comments about the respondent’s attitude, unusual circumstances, disruptions, etc:
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